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Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants:
The Case Against Excessive Hand-
Wringing over Legal Standards
Who is Atrios?By the fall of 2003, there were people who wanted to
know.  Former Clinton adviser Sidney Blumenthal was asked
whether he is Atrios.1  Professor Glenn Reynolds of the Univer-
sity of Tennessee Law School speculated (through his Internet
persona, “InstaPundit”) that Atrios was Democratic operative
Robert Shrum, while jesting that Atrios may be Princeton Uni-
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.  The author
would like to thank Judith Gelb, Tom Ginsburg, Elizabeth Inglehart, and Howard
Vogel for helpful comments and discussions.
1 LiberalOasis, LiberalOasis Interviews Sidney Blumenthal , at  http://www.liberal
oasis.com/blumenthal.htm (last modified May 28, 2003) [hereinafter Blumenthal
Interview].
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versity economics professor and New York Times  columnist Paul
Krugman.2  Internet users speculated and debated about who
Atrios was, conducting polls on the subject,3 and suggesting that
he4 might be Blumenthal, Shrum, or, more whimsically, Fidel
Castro or Nick Nolte.5  Atrios himself licenses the sale of prod-
ucts proclaiming, “I am Atrios!”6
Atrios is the pseudonym of an anonymous (until recently) indi-
vidual who maintains “Eschaton,” a popular, liberal Internet
website or weblog (commonly known as a “blog”).7  Though his
name and website are unfamiliar to many people, he is an influ-
ential figure in current political discourse.  The website receives
100,000 visits per day,8 a figure that is comparable to the daily
circulation of newspapers among the top 100 dailies in the
United States.9  His influence exceeds his readership, however,
because he is read, cited, and quoted, by other news makers, in-
cluding Krugman,10 Blumenthal,11 the author of the New Repub-
lic’s Notebook ,12 columnist and fellow blogger Andrew
Sullivan,13 cartoonist Tom Tomorrow,14 and the popular comedy
2 Posting of Glenn Reynolds, to instapundit.com (Dec. 17, 2002), at  http://in-
stapundit.com/archives/006219.php.
3 Posting of Charles Kuffner, to www.offthekuff.com (Dec. 31, 2002), at  http://
www.offthekuff.com/mt/archives/001425.html.
4 Atrios on several occasions indicated that he was male. See , e.g. , Posting of
Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Eschaton, at  http://atrios.blogspot.com/2002_06_16_
atrios_archive.html#77834125; Posting of Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Eschaton, at
http://atrios.blogspot.com/2002_07_14_atrios_archive.html#78939068.  Eventually,
he permitted his identity to be disclosed as Duncan Black, a Ph. D. economist and
former professor.  Posting of Jeralyn Merritt, to www.talkleft.com (July 26, 2004), at
http://talkleft.com/new_archives/007385.html.  Dr. Black is now responsible for edi-
torial operations at Media Matters for America; see  http://mediamatters.org/etc/
about.html.  In this Article, I refer to specific anonymous individuals using the gen-
der pronoun implied by their online personas.
5 Posting of Max B. Sawicky, Maxbsawicky, to maxspeak.org (Dec. 18, 2002), at
http://maxspeak.org/gm/archives/00000746.html.
6 Eschaton online store, CafePress.com, at  http://www.cafepress.com/atrios (last
visited Jan. 25, 2005).
7 Eschaton, at  http://www.atrios.blogspot.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
8 N.Z.Bear, Ecosystem Details:  Eschaton (providing an independent tally of in-
ternet visitors), at  http://truthlaidbear.com/showdetails.php?host=http://atrios. blog-
spot.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
9 Top 100 Daily Newspapers in the United States, at  http://www. infoplease.com/
ipea/A0004420.html (last modified Sept. 30, 2002).
10 Paul Krugman, Gotta Have Faith , N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at A35.
11 Blumenthal Interview , supra  note 1.
12 Notebook , NEW REPUBLIC, March 17, 2003, at 8.
13 E.g. , Posting of Andrew Sullivan, to andrewsullivan.com (Feb. 4, 2004 5:01:15
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 3 12-APR-05 10:43
Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants 797
and news program, The Daily Show .15  Atrios, along with Sulli-
van and a third blogger, Joshua Micah Marshall, have received
credit for keeping media attention on the controversial remarks
made by then-Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott, resulting in
Mr. Lott’s resignation from that post in December 2002.16
Like many bloggers and others who use the Internet to spread
information, Atrios chose to do so anonymously.  While Atrios
claimed to do so for reasons that “aren’t actually particularly in-
teresting,”17 others choose to act anonymously out of concern
(well-founded or not) that their online statements will result in
negative off-line consequences.  Another prominent, anonymous
blogger, known as Hesiod, implied that he chose to remain anon-
ymous out of fear for his safety.18  A more common concern is
that online statements may affect employment.  For example, a
Microsoft employee who maintained a blog under his own name
was fired for posting a photograph of Macintosh computers pur-
chased by Microsoft,19 while a Delta Air Lines flight attendant
was suspended without pay for blogging that included posting a
picture of herself in uniform and commenting negatively on her
PM), at  http://www.andrewsullivan.com/index.php?dish_inc=archives/2004_02_01_
dish_archive.html.
14 Suzy Hansen, Tomorrow ’s News, Today! , SALON.COM (Aug. 14, 2003), at  http://
archive.salon.com/books/feature/archives/2003/08114/perkins/index_np.html.
15 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart , “‘Fact’ Obsessed Bloggers”  (Comedy Central
television broadcast Feb. 16, 2005).
16 Noah Shachtman, With Incessant Postings, a Pundit Stirs the Pot , N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 2003, at G5; Oliver Burkeman & Kevin Canfield, ‘Bloggers’ Lead the Way in
Lott Story , THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 17, 2002, at D1; Bloggers Catch What
Washington Post Missed , THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2002, at 13; Al Fasoldt, The
Mighty Blog; Lott Saga a Milestone for Online Pundits , TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 8,
2003, at 3; see generally  Helen Dewar & Mike Allen, Lott Resigns as Leader of
Senate Republicans; Frist Expected to Be Named His Successor , WASH. POST, Dec.
22, 2002, at A1.
17 Beth Gillin, Booming Blogs , PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Aug. 21, 2003, available
at  http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/entertainment/6579970.htm.  Atrios writes,
“Though it is amusing sometimes in the end I find any discussion of ‘Who is Atrios?’
rather silly—at least silly if people actually care . . . .  Who am I?  Some guy in
Philadelphia who runs a weblog.”  Posting of Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Es-
chaton (Jan. 01, 2003, 3:29 P.M.), at  http://atrios.blogspot.com/2002_12_29_atrios_
archive.html (footnote omitted).
18 Hesiod, Visitation Rights, April 9, 2003, available at  http://web.archive.org/web/
20030929082706/http://counterspin.blogspot.com/2003_04_06_counterspin.archive.
html#200122746.
19 Todd Bishop, Microsoft Fires Worker Over Weblog , SEATTLE POST-INTELLI-
GENCER, Oct. 30, 2003, available at  http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/146115_
blogger30.html; see also  Posting of Michael Hanscom, to eclecticism (Oct. 27, 2003),
at  http://www.michaelhanscom.com/eclecticism/2003/10/of_blogging_and.html.
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job.20  Another blogger, “Marine’s Girl,” the girlfriend of a U.S.
Marine stationed in Iraq, chose to discontinue her blog after re-
ceiving a message from a “career military man” that he believed
she had divulged secret military information and that he was for-
warding her blog to Marine Corps Central Command to be
“tracked down.”21
Despite Atrios’ efforts to protect his anonymity, that anonym-
ity was threatened in October 2003 as a result of one of the
thousands of messages he had posted to his blog.  On October 7,
2003, he posted a link to a blog maintained by Donald Luskin, a
conservative author.22  Atrios titled the link “Diary of a Stalker,”
a pejorative reference to Mr. Luskin’s writing about personally
attending an event involving the liberal Mr. Krugman.
On October 29, 2003, Atrios received a letter from Mr. Lus-
kin’s lawyer alleging that the post was defamatory and demand-
ing that the post, as well as comments posted by Eschaton
readers, be removed from the Eschaton site.23  The letter made a
none-too-subtle threat that, if Atrios did not comply, Luskin’s
lawyer would seek to unmask him: “Determining your identity
for the purpose of making service of process can be easily accom-
plished through a subpoena to Blogspot.com.”24
The Atrios dispute was quickly settled.  The claim of defama-
tion was weak,25 and the parties agreed simply to post a joint
statement resolving the matter.26  Yet, if Luskin had a case that
20 See  Posting of Gary Leff, to webflyer (Oct. 2, 2004), at  http://www.webflyer.
com/blog/posts.php?entry=1905.
21 Posting of Marine’s Girl, to A Marine’s Girl (Nov. 15, 2003, 7:55 P.M.), at  http:/
/marinegirl.blogspot.com/2003_11_09_marinegirl_archive.html.  While the archived
version of this information remains available through the above website, it is no
longer accessible through A Marine’s Girl website, and it is not clear that the author
intends it to remain so available.  A highly truncated version of A Marine’s Girl,
consisting of just a handful of non-controversial posts, is now available at http://
marinegirl.blogspot.com.
22 Posting of Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Eschaton (Oct. 7, 2003, 12:45 P.M.), at
http://atrios.blogspot.com/2003_10_05_atrios_archive.html.
23 Posting of Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Eschaton (Oct. 29, 2003, 5:03 P.M.), at
http://atrios.blogspot.com/2003_10_26_atrios_archive.html.
24 Id.  Blogspot.com is the Internet service provider that provides computerized
hosting facilities for Atrios and many other bloggers.
25 Luskin’s lawyer is based in New York.  Under New York law, as in most juris-
dictions, the apparent reference to Luskin as a “stalker” would likely be non-defam-
atory as a statement of opinion. See, e.g. , Brian v. Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1129
(N.Y. 1995).
26 Posting of Atrios, atrios@comcast.net, to Eschaton (Nov. 4, 2003, 5:02 P.M.), at
http://atrios.blogspot. com/2003_11_02_atrios_archive.html#106798153621133681.
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was even a bit stronger—not an improbability in an Internet cul-
ture that increasingly favors vituperative rhetoric that can, at
times, cross the line into defamation—he would have had a good
reason to identify Atrios so that he could serve him with process
and, eventually, enforce a judgment.
This kind of case—in which a plaintiff seeks to identify a de-
fendant for purposes of serving process—poses a substantial
challenge for courts because they are called upon at the very out-
set of the case to make the critical, and often outcome-determi-
native, decision whether to permit discovery of the defendant’s
identity.  As Paul Alan Levy of Public Citizen’s Litigation Group
has perceptively observed, the identification of a defendant for
purposes of service of process may in itself constitute relief for
the plaintiff—and may even be the sole relief the plaintiff really
desires.27  On the other hand, refusing to permit the defendant’s
identification may as a practical matter bar plaintiff’s claim, thus
providing defendant the relief he or she seeks.  In either case, the
decision is usually made at the outset of litigation, before a full
record may be developed.  What is worse, the decision will often
be subject to only limited appellate review, as it is merely an in-
terlocutory discovery order and need not lead to a final
judgment.
Because rules of civil procedure have been drafted, for the
most part, with little or no consideration of the problem
presented by cases involving unknown defendants,28 courts and
commentators have urged the development of new, judge-made
standards to address claims of this nature, which are often re-
27 E.g. , Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic
Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae at 8-9, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa.
2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002).  The brief states:
In a lawsuit filed over anonymous speech, the identification of the speaker
provides an important measure of relief to the plaintiff because it enables
the plaintiff to employ extra-judicial self-help measures to counteract both
the speech and the speaker, and creates a substantial risk of harm to the
speaker, who not only loses the right to anonymous speech but is exposed
to the plaintiff’s self-help efforts to restrain or oppose his speech. In our
system of laws, we ordinarily do not give substantial relief of this sort, even
on a preliminary basis, absent proof that the relief is justified because suc-
cess is likely and the balance of hardships favors the relief.
Id .
28 Indeed, it was only eight years ago that Professor Carol Rice argued that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permitted claims against fictitious name defend-
ants.  Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe:  It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Rec-
ognize John Doe Parties , 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 883, 918 (1996) [hereinafter Rice].
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ferred to as “John Doe” cases.  A working group of public-inter-
est organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), Public Citizen Litigation Group (“Public Citizen”),
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center, has cooperated in an effort to develop legal
standards limiting this type of discovery.29  The New Jersey Ap-
pellate Division is the only appellate court to rule on the proper
scope of discovery in this area.30  In companion decisions, Den-
drite International, Inc. v. Doe31 and Immunomedics, Inc. v.
Doe ,32 that court created new, heightened standards for plaintiffs
seeking to identify John Doe defendants through discovery.
Those decisions have been identified as “leading” cases in this
area and they have been widely praised for creating these new
standards.33  This category of cases has also attracted considera-
ble academic,34 professional,35 journalistic,36 and, in some in-
29 See  Audio Tape:  12th Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy (April
19, 2002) (on file with author).  These organizations have been prominent as amici
curiae or counsel for parties in significant cases. E.g. , Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. Doe, 775
A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (Public Citizen and ACLU); Melvin v.
Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (ACLU); Mary P. Gallagher, Defamation Plaintiffs
Cannot Learn Anonymous Online Critics’ Identities , N.J.L.J., Jan. 7, 2002 (Public
Citizen and ACLU amici in unpublished case).  Public Citizen has made available an
excellent collection of resources concerning this issue from a civil liberties perspec-
tive. See  Public Citizen, Internet Free Speech , http://www.citizen.org/litigation/
briefs/IntFreeSpch/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
30 In Melvin v. Doe , 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
declined to reach the merits of the issue, ruling instead that the intermediate appel-
late court had incorrectly concluded that the discovery order was not appealable.
Id.  at 50.  While remanding to the intermediate court, the Supreme Court majority
did make some substantive observations concerning the merits. See id.  at 51
(Cappy, J., concurring).  Those observations are addressed infra  at text accompany-
ing notes 76-82.
In America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co. , 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va.
2001), the Virginia Supreme Court did not reach the issue of what standards should
apply because it refused to allow the requested discovery on the grounds that the
party seeking the discovery had itself refused to disclose its identity.
31 775 A.2d at 756.  The author acted as counsel to Dendrite in connection with
this case.
32 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
33 Counsel for the ACLU, which acted as amicus in Dendrite , has expressed the
hope that Dendrite  will be followed in other states, “call[ing] the Dendrite  standard
a ‘fair, workable test that stems the tide of using the threat of the subpoena power to
punish people for criticizing others online.’”  Stephen R. Buckingham & Alix R.
Rubin, Anonymous ’Posters ’ Complicate Discovery , N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at 4.
34 See , e.g. , Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe:  Defamation & Discourse
in Cyberspace , 49 DUKE L.J. 855 (2000); Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the
Problem of Anonymous Online Speech , COM. LAW., Fall 2000, at 3; David L. Sobel,
The Process that “John Doe” is Due:  Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet
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stances, legislative37 interest.
Though well intentioned, the rush to apply new standards
should be slowed.  The threat to core First Amendment free
speech rights from too readily identifying anonymous speakers is
real, and should be taken seriously by the courts.  At the same
time, however, the new standards offer little real protection for
anonymous speech beyond what courts can provide under ex-
isting rules.  In exchange for this limited benefit, however, the
grafting of new tests onto existing rules threatens to compromise
Anonymity , 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000); Shaun B. Spencer, Cyberslapp Suits and
John Doe Subpoenas:  Balancing Anonymity and Accountability in Cyberspace , 19 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493 (2001); Joshua R. Furman, Comment,
Cybersmear or Cyber-Slapp:  Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does
as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation , 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213
(2001); Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a (Screen) Name:  The First Amend-
ment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet
Speakers in Online Defamation Cases , 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745 (2002); Margo
E.K. Reder & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Comment, Corporate Cybersmear:  Em-
ployers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of Anonymous Em-
ployee Internet Posters , 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 195 (2001-02); David
C. Scileppi, Note, Anonymous Corporate Defamation Plaintiffs:  Trampling the First
Amendment or Protecting the Rights of Litigants? , 54 FLA. L. REV. 333 (2002); Scot
Wilson, Comment, Corporate Criticism on the Internet:  The Fine Line Between
Anonymous Speech and Cybersmear , 29 PEPP. L. REV. 533 (2002).
35 See, e.g. , Matthew E. Babcock et al., Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law
Issues (July 2002), available at  http://www.medialaw.org/Template.cfm?Section=
archive7&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1065;
Wendy Beetlestone, Litigation Unique Issues Posed by Defamation Suits Involving
Statements Made via the Internet , THE INTERNET NEWSLETTER, July 2002, at 1; Mat-
thew S. Effland, Digital Age Defamation:  Free Speech v. Freedom from Responsibil-
ity on the Internet , 75 FLA. B.J. 63 (Nov. 2001); Michael D. Goldhaber, Fifth-Year
Develops “Cybersmear” Practice , N.Y.L.J., July 14, 2000; J. Burke McCormick & D.
Alan Rudlin, Not Mere Negligence , 38 TRIAL 32  (Mar. 2002); Richard L. Ravin &
Van V. Mejia, Privacy in New Jersey Anonymous Online Speech:  New Jersey’s First
Amendment Privacy Interest , 213 N.J. LAW. 9 (Feb. 2002); Roger M. Rosen &
Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation:
Plaintiffs’ Counsel Can Utilize Specific Procedures to Unmask an Online Wrongdoer ,
24 L.A. LAW. 19 (Oct. 2001); Robert L. Weigel & Lee G. Dunst, Suing “John Doe”:
Guidelines for Piercing the Veil of Online Anonymity , WALL STREET LAW. (Nov.
2001), at  http://www.cybersecuritieslaw.com/GDC/wslsuing.htm.
36 Jane Black, A Victory, of Sorts, for Spouting Off , BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, July
20, 2001, at  http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul2001/nf20010720_543.
htm; Mary P. Gallagher, N.J. Limits Right to ID on the Net , NAT’L L.J., July 30,
2001, at A4; Judy Greenwald, Court Sets Rules for Piercing; Web Anonymity , BUS.
INS., July 30, 2001, at 1; Dugie Standeford, ISPs Should Tell Consumers When Sub-
poenas Seek Their Identity, Group Says , WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Vol. 3, No. 134
(July 12, 2002).
37 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (Michie Supp. 2002) (stating the procedures
for compelling disclosure of identity of individuals alleged to have committed torts
while acting anonymously on the Internet).
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the values protected by other constitutional provisions, including
due process, equal protection, and the right to trial by jury.  In
particular, application of an outcome-determinative heightened
discovery standard singles out one class of plaintiffs who are sys-
tematically deprived of the litigation procedures, specifically dis-
covery and trial, that are available to other plaintiffs, including
plaintiffs with claims that are similar in all regards except that
they allege harm by plaintiffs who did not act anonymously.
Part I of this Article summarizes the developing approach of
courts to these John Doe cases, from an initial permissive ap-
proach allowing discovery freely to a more restrictive approach
that substantially restricts discovery.  Part II explains that while
the Internet acts as a vehicle for empowering individual speakers,
the anonymity of its speakers also has considerable potential to
facilitate schemes which violate the law and infringe upon private
rights, with the result that, as groups, both plaintiffs and defend-
ants in these cases have significant interests at stake.  In light of
these competing interests, Part III analyzes First Amendment
considerations and concludes that the First Amendment, while
offering protection for anonymous speech, does not require crea-
tion of rules systematically favoring or disfavoring discovery in
this context, at least absent a conclusion that existing procedural
rules are insufficient.  Part IV analyzes existing procedures and
doctrine and concludes that they are sufficient, without creation
of new standards, to balance the competing interests.  Part V pro-
vides a critique of the trend toward creating new standards, argu-
ing that they do little to advance defendants’ legitimate interests
while compromising plaintiffs’ interests and risking unintended
consequences.
I
OVERVIEW OF “JOHN DOE” DECISIONS
A. Pre-Dendrite Decisions
In the late 1990s, it became common for companies and others
aggrieved by anonymous Internet speech to seek to learn the
identity of the offending speakers.  In many cases, Internet ser-
vice providers (“ISPs”) would simply provide identifying infor-
mation upon request, without even requiring a subpoena.  In
other cases, ISPs would produce the requested information in re-
sponse to attorney-issued subpoenas, without providing the
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speaker an opportunity to object or seek judicial intervention.
Significantly, such attorney-issued subpoenas were often invalid,
as many jurisdictions allow only court-ordered discovery prior to
service of process (which obviously cannot occur until the defen-
dant has been identified).38
When subpoenas did receive judicial scrutiny, the discovery
was almost uniformly granted.  Most of the rulings were made
either with no formal opinion or, at most, with a brief, unpub-
lished opinion and contained little if any analysis of the compet-
ing interests.39  In one case where the court did attempt to
analyze the issues, it permitted discovery on the clearly errone-
ous theory that the First Amendment does not concern private
action, without recognizing that subpoena power constitutes gov-
ernment action.40
One of the few early published decisions, Columbia Insurance
Co. v. Seescandy.com ,41 attempted a serious analysis of the issue,
but ultimately left significant questions unanswered.  In Sees-
38 See, e.g. , ILL. S. CT. R. 201(d) (“Prior to the time all defendants have appeared
or are required to appear, no discovery procedure shall be noticed or otherwise
initiated without leave of court granted upon good cause shown.”); N.J. R. CT. 4:14-
1 (requiring a court order prior to service of defendant for a deposition); N.J. R. CT.
4:14-7 (requiring that the subpoena for production of documents also compel simul-
taneous deposition); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2005) (per-
mitting pre-commencement discovery before action commenced, “but only by court
order”). But see id.  § 3106(a) (allowing a party, after commencement, to take depo-
sition of any party without court order except for the party whose time to file a
pleading has not expired).  In addition, in most cases the relevant ISP will be out-of-
state, and thus will frequently require court involvement in the issuing of a subpoena
for that reason alone. See, e.g. , ILL. S. CT. R. 204(b); N.J. R. CT. 4:11-4; N.Y. C.
P.L.R. § 3102(e).
In some cases, plaintiffs have sought to avoid this problem by joining and serving
the ISP as a defendant.  This tactic, though sometimes effective tactically as a way of
avoiding judicial oversight, is generally not appropriate because most courts that
have considered the issue have concluded that ISPs enjoy immunity from suit for
information posted by others under Section 230(c) of the Federal Communications
Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000). See  Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d
655, 659-60 (7th Cir. 2003) (declining to resolve issue, but noting that all four circuits
to consider the issue have found immunity).
39 See, e.g. , Hvide v. John Does 1 Through 8, No. 99-22831, Order at 1-2 (Fla. Cir.
Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author); Biomatrix, Inc. v. Doe I, No. BER-L-670-00,
Order at 1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 28, 2000) (on file with author); In re
Imperial Sugar Co., No. 2000-33782 (Tex. Dist. Ct. July 21, 2000) (on file with
author).
40 See Stone & Webster, Inc. v. John Does 1 Through 10, No. 99MS-09-0173, slip
op. at 6 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with author); cf . Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1948) (holding that judicial enforcement of private covenants consti-
tutes state action).
41 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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candy.com , the holder of various trademarks relating to See’s
Candy Shops, Inc., brought federal trademark infringement and
other claims against defendants who had, among other things,
registered the domain names “seescandy.com” and “see-
candys.com.”42  The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining or-
der and preliminary injunction enjoining the violations.  The
court, rather than the plaintiff, raised the issue of identifying the
defendants by denying the injunction on the grounds that an in-
junction would be ineffective without the identity of the defend-
ants and suggested that plaintiff could submit an application for
discovery to obtain that information.  The court observed that
there was a need to balance “provid[ing] injured parties with a
forum in which they may seek redress for grievances” with the
“valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously or
pseudonymously.”43
While courts continue to struggle with this need for balance,
Seescandy.com  addressed it by requiring four “safeguards” prior
to granting discovery of the identity of John Doe defendants.
These were (1) “plaintiff should identify the missing party with
sufficient specificity” to establish the court’s jurisdiction; (2)
plaintiff “should identify all previous steps taken to locate the
elusive defendant”; (3) “plaintiff should establish to the Court’s
satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand
a motion to dismiss”; and (4) plaintiff should make a formal re-
quest for the discovery stating the specific discovery required and
the reasons why that discovery would likely identify the defen-
dant.44  Although each of these requirements makes it somewhat
less likely that the discovery will occur, they advance different
interests.  The first is designed to protect the court itself from
issuing subpoenas outside its jurisdiction, a concern that is partic-
ularly relevant to federal courts like the one in Seescandy.com
(as diversity jurisdiction will systematically be unavailable when
the defendant’s identity is unknown45), although it may also con-
cern state courts where, for instance, there is a lack of clear nexus
to the forum state.  The second requirement is atypical in the dis-
covery context—parties do not generally have to establish that
they have sought information from other sources in order to ob-
42 Id . at 575-76.
43 Id . at 579.
44 Id . at 578-80.
45 See  Rice, supra  note 29, at 919-26. R
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tain formal discovery46—but evokes equitable doctrines applied
in other contexts, such as preliminary injunction requests, where
courts are reluctant to exercise their full powers when parties
seeking relief have not first shown their own substantial efforts to
protect their rights.47  The third requirement, at a minimum, as-
sures that the fact that discovery is sought prior to service of pro-
cess does not expand the scope of discovery, although, as set
forth below, it has been interpreted as a significant, substantive
limitation on discovery.  The fourth, while requiring more than
an ordinary discovery demand, simply recognizes that the proce-
dural posture of these discovery demands requires court inter-
vention and, therefore, articulation of the basis for that
intervention.
While each of Seescandy.com ’s safeguards could prove contro-
versial in a given case, the most significant impediment to discov-
ery is the requirement that the plaintiff’s complaint could survive
a “motion to dismiss.”  While the Seescandy.com  opinion uses
the phrase “motion to dismiss,” implying a minimal level of scru-
tiny, the court makes clear that it means to require more than
that, although how much more is left unsaid.  In particular, the
court holds that “[a] conclusory pleading will never be sufficient”
but, instead of analyzing the complaint under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)’s “short and plain statement of the
claim” requirement, it suggests an inquiry analogous to the
“probable cause” inquiry in criminal procedure.48  In the civil
context, “probable cause” has been defined to “require[ ] no
more than a ‘reasonable belief that there is a chance that [a]
claim may be held valid upon adjudication.’”49  As “probable
cause” is not ordinarily a standard applied to claims in civil pro-
cedure, the Seescandy.com formulation left many questions un-
answered, including: Is the standard essentially a motion to
46 See, e.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (stating that limitation on discovery of rele-
vant information available from non-discovery source where other source is “more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”).
47 See, e.g. , Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (rely-
ing in part on plaintiff’s delay in seeking injunction as basis for vacating district
court’s entry of injunction); S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of
America, 692 F.2d 814, 818 (1st Cir. 1982) (vacating preliminary injunction where
purported irreparable harm was “largely self-inflicted”).
48 Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
49 Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
62-63 (1993) (quoting Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 178 N.E.2d 485, 488 (Mass.
1961)).
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dismiss standard, augmented with a requirement of specificity in
pleading (a requirement that exists in any event in most jurisdic-
tions for defamation claims)?  Is the plaintiff required to produce
evidence?  If so, is the plaintiff required to provide sufficient evi-
dence to support all elements of the claimed cause of action (in
effect requiring plaintiff to meet a summary judgment, rather
than a motion to dismiss, standard), and can the defendant avoid
discovery by producing evidence defeating plaintiff’s claim?  If
not, how is the court to test the reasonableness of plaintiff’s be-
lief in the claim?  Perhaps most difficult, how is the court to han-
dle the case where discovery of evidence necessary to an element
of plaintiff’s case requires identifying the defendant?
B. Dendrite and Immunomedics
To date, Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe50 remains the only
appellate decision to address standards for discovery of the iden-
tity of John Doe defendants.51  In Dendrite , the plaintiff, a pub-
licly-traded provider of software and services to the
pharmaceutical industry, sought to identify four fictitious name
defendants based on their postings on the Yahoo! bulletin board
devoted to the company.52  The trial court allowed discovery to
proceed for two of the defendants, both former employees whose
postings either themselves violated the standard Dendrite em-
ployment contract or, in some instances, constituted admissions
of off-line breaches.53  The court denied discovery as to two other
defendants, one of whom, “John Doe No. 3,” was the subject of
the appeal.54  Dendrite’s claim against John Doe No. 3 was based
on several defamatory messages, including false allegations of ac-
counting misconduct and of the CEO’s trying unsuccessfully to
shop the company.55  John Doe No. 3 admitted financial motives
for his postings, including trading in Dendrite’s stock and a con-
cern that Dendrite’s stock performance would affect his or her
own employer.56 The Dendrite  appeal was argued together with
Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe ,57 in which the defendant, a former
50 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
51 See supra  note 30.
52 775 A.2d at 760.
53 Id . at 763-64.
54 Id . at 764.
55 Id . at 769.
56 See id . at 762-65.
57 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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employee whose postings were alleged to breach her employ-
ment agreement, appealed a decision allowing discovery of her
identity.58  Both the denial of discovery in Dendrite  and the
granting of discovery in Immunomedics  were affirmed on
appeal.59
The Dendrite court accepted the core challenge raised by John
Doe No. 3 (and by virtually all John Doe defendants) to discov-
ery of his or her identity—what the court described as the “well-
established First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”60
Based on this concern, the Dendrite court established “guide-
lines” for trial courts deciding John Doe applications.61  These
guidelines impose four requirements before a court should per-
mit discovery of the identity of the John Doe defendant:
• First, the court should require notice to the defendant and
an opportunity to be heard;
• Second, the court should require the plaintiff to set forth
the exact statements that are the basis of its claim;
• Third, the court should receive evidence and determine not
only whether the complaint would survive a motion to dis-
miss but whether plaintiff has submitted sufficient prima
facie evidence to support its claim;
• Fourth, assuming plaintiff has presented a prima facie
claim, “the court must balance the defendant’s First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the
strength of the prima facie case presented and the necessity
for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to
allow the plaintiff to properly proceed.”62
While the first two requirements are hardly controversial (at
least where notice to the defendant is feasible), the latter two
present very troubling limitations on the rights of plaintiffs to
pursue claims against defendants who have acted anonymously
on the Internet.  As a practical matter, these decisions accord the
trial court broad discretion to allow or deny the requested dis-
covery.  The third factor, the ability to produce evidence in sup-
port of plaintiff’s claim, will often depend dispositively on the
identity of the defendant.  For example, when “actual malice” is
an element of a defamation claim, the plaintiff will need to know
the defendant’s identity, and in all likelihood take the defen-
58 Id . at 774-75.
59 Dendrite , 775 A.2d at 772; Immunomedics , 775 A.2d at 778.
60 775 A.2d at 760; see also  Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46-50 (Pa. 2003).  The
nature and extent of this right is addressed in Part III, infra .
61 775 A.2d at 760.
62 Id . at 760-61.
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dant’s deposition, to meet that burden.63  Likewise, where the
poster is a competitor, discovery may be focused on the competi-
tor’s efforts to lure customers or employees away from the plain-
tiff.  Where stock manipulation is suspected, the defendant’s
trading records will be essential to proving damages.  Moreover,
as proving damages may involve complicated (and expensive) ex-
pert testimony concerning matters such as the effect of postings
on stock prices, plaintiff has a strong interest in knowing whether
the defendant has the financial means to satisfy a judgment
before investing the resources in gathering such evidence.64
The fourth Dendrite  factor is even more troubling.  In effect,
the court acknowledges that, even if plaintiff has alleged a viable
legal claim against the defendant—and supported that claim with
admissible evidence—the court may still exercise discretion to
stop the case in its tracks, at least to the extent that the “strength
of the prima facie case” is given less weight than “the defendant’s
First Amendment right of anonymous free speech.”65  This is an
exceedingly broad level of authority to grant to a single, trial-
level judge, and is inconsistent with the spirit of such rights as
due process and the right to trial by jury that generally animate
judicial decision-making at the pre-trial stage.
The “Dendrite  test” goes beyond what is necessary to satisfy
the First Amendment.  While the First Amendment right to
speak anonymously is “well-established,” it does not necessarily
require broad procedural protections in the John Doe context.66
As set forth below, the right to speak anonymously has been rec-
ognized in the context of broad-based prior restraints on catego-
ries of anonymous speech (e.g., leaflets, petitions), and even then
has been limited where necessary for important government in-
terests (e.g., regulation of elections).  The Supreme Court has
63 See, e.g. , Melvin , 836 A.2d at 46.
64 At least one court has recognized this practical need for discovering the defen-
dant’s identity:
[P]laintiff [judge] needs to know the identity of the Doe defendants prior
to incurring the expenses and other burdens of a trial, because it is ques-
tionable whether plaintiff would wish to proceed with a trial if John Doe
turned out to be, for example, an inmate incarcerated pursuant to a trial
before plaintiff.  In this instance, it is unlikely that any judgment that she
obtained would be satisfied.
Melvin v. Doe, 49 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 453 (2000), appeal quashed on other grounds ,
789 A.2d 696 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), rev’d , 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003).
65 See  775 A.2d at 760-61.
66 See infra  Part III.
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never interpreted the right as precluding discovery of the identity
of a particular individual accused of illegal or actionable speech;
indeed, the Court has recognized that common-law claims such
as defamation are an essential balance to the right to speak
anonymously.67
This broad assumption of judicial power over whether a claim
will proceed is particularly troubling because it is substantially
insulated from appellate review. Dendrite creates a standard
that makes it unlikely that an appellate court will revisit a trial
judge’s decision unless the court below abused its discretion—a
high standard that virtually assures inconsistent results.  Indeed,
Dendrite  and Immunomedics  involved just such an inconsistency.
The appellate court, while holding that Dendrite had properly
plead a claim for defamation based on the challenged postings,
affirmed the decision to deny discovery because it found Den-
drite lacked sufficient proof of damages (normally not required
pre-discovery and as to which discovery of John Doe’s identity
might be relevant).68  In contrast, the same court affirmed the
decision to grant Immunomedics discovery, even though Immu-
nomedics had offered no proof of damages.69
In tension with First Amendment concerns, the broad discre-
tion accorded trial judges by Dendrite  and Immunomedics cre-
ates a dangerous limitation on the due process rights of plaintiffs
to seek redress for injuries.  Such subjective standards risk trans-
forming our elaborate judicial system—with the time-tested due
process rights it affords—into an unregulated judicial “gut
check” as to the merit or importance of a particular plaintiff’s
claim.  When a plaintiff is denied discovery of the identity of a
John Doe defendant, that decision, as a practical matter, is likely
67 See infra  Part III.A.1.
68 See Dendrite , 775 A.2d at 769-70.
69 The Immunomedics  decision rejected Jean Doe’s argument that she should be
allowed to disprove plaintiff’s claim before discovery of her identity.  775 A.2d at
778.  The court’s reasoning in this regard is difficult to reconcile with its decision in
Dendrite  establishing a special four-part test for discovery of the identity of anony-
mous Internet posters. See Dendrite,  775 A.2d at 760-71.  According to the Immu-
nomedics  court,
To allow a potential tortfeasor to disprove a plaintiff’s case before the
plaintiff is even provided the opportunity to learn the defendant’s identity,
let alone gather any discovery, has no foundation . . . .  [Jean Doe] should
not be afforded an advantageous position based on the media in which she
chose to commit the breach of contract or because she committed that al-
leged breach anonymously.
775 A.2d at 778.
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to have the same effect as a final judgment for the defendant.  If
the plaintiff cannot serve the defendant with process, it will be
effectively precluded from all relief.  Though the application for
discovery is not a motion to dismiss, it has a similar effect be-
cause the court rules on the merits of the case—despite the fact
that the plaintiff faces a higher burden and is deprived of the
ordinary protections of the discovery process—and because the
plaintiff cannot proceed with its claim if the discovery is denied.
In some ways, the decision to deny discovery may be even more
draconian than a dismissal.  In particular, an ordinary motion to
dismiss can dispose of all claims against a party and result in a
final judgment appealable as of right under a standard of de novo
review.  In contrast, a discovery motion is decided under a simi-
lar (indeed, heightened) standard and has a similar result, yet in
most jurisdictions it is not appealable as of right70 and, at least
under Dendrite , would face a higher, abuse of discretion, stan-
dard on appeal.
C. Developments After  Dendrite
Dendrite  has been widely hailed as a sound decision that prop-
erly resolves the issues and balances the interests raised by suits
against anonymous Internet posters. Public Citizen’s Paul Levy
described the decision as “a tremendous victory for free
70 See, e.g. , N.J. R. 2:2-3(a), 2:2-4; ILL. S. CT. R. 301, 304.  Unlike most states, New
York does permit routine appeal of interlocutory orders. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5701(a)
(McKinney 1995 & Supp. 2005).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held John Doe discovery orders to be
appealable as of right under Pennsylvania’s collateral order rule, PA. R. APP. P. 313.
Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 44 (Pa. 2003).  However, the appealability of such an
order could likely be resolved differently by different states, under different appel-
late rules.  Even in Pennsylvania, the decision required a finding that the appeal
presented an issue of public import, id . at 47, an issue as to which other states’ courts
might differ.  Indeed, even future Pennsylvania courts might reach a different con-
clusion in future cases that, unlike Melvin , do not involve political speech directed at
a public figure, or that involve nothing more than application of a discovery stan-
dard (once one is established) rather than determination of that standard.
Occasionally, a dispute over identifying a Doe may be appealable as of right when
the proceeding arises under the Uniform Foreign Depositions Act (“UFDA”), on
the theory that the court’s jurisdiction is limited to the discovery issue and that its
disposition of that issue is therefore final. See  America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 381-82 (Va. 2001).  However, since the scope of
a court’s review under the UFDA of the primary court’s discovery request is gener-
ally quite narrow, this rule does not provide disappointed plaintiffs with systematic
access to appellate review.
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speech.”71  ACLU counsel J.C. Sayler has called it a “fair, worka-
ble test that stems the tide of using the threat of the subpoena
power to punish people for criticizing others online” but that
“doesn’t close the courthouse door to those with meritorious
claims.”72  Commentators have argued that Dendrite  achieves
the proper “balance between employees’ speech and privacy
rights, employers’ reputational interests, and the necessity of
compelling identity disclosure,”73 “that the guidelines adopted
by . . . Dendrite  . . . should be uniformly employed by courts
dealing with the issue of compelled disclosure by ISPs,”74 and
that states should adopt “the Dendrite  screening factors.”75
Since Dendrite , no published decision has articulated a new or
different standard for resolving John Doe discovery applications.
In a closely watched case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
December 2003 declined to resolve the issue, ruling instead that
the issue should be remanded to Pennsylvania’s intermediate ap-
pellate court, which had erroneously held that the issue was a
non-appealable interlocutory order.76  While that decision, Mel-
vin v. Doe , did not resolve the issue, it did make a number of
observations that may provide hints to how the court will resolve
the issue if it reaches that court again.77  In Melvin , the plaintiff is
a former state court judge who is asserting defamation claims
against an individual who anonymously posted allegations on the
Internet that she was illegally lobbying then-Pennsylvania gover-
nor Tom Ridge.78  The case thus arises in a context that is partic-
ularly favorable to the defendant, as the speech involved is core
political speech, protected, for example, by the heightened “ac-
71 Mary P. Gallagher, Court Erects Roadblocks to Flagging Cyberspammers on the
Internet:  Four-Step Process Must Be Followed Before Forcing ISP to Disclose ,
N.J.L.J., July 16, 2001.
72 Stephen R. Buckingham & Alix R. Rubin, Anonymous “Posters” Complicate
Discovery , N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19, 2001, at s4.
73 Margo E. K. Reder & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Corporate Cybersmear:  Em-
ployers File John Doe Defamation Lawsuits Seeking the Identity of Anonymous Em-
ployee Internet Posters , 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 196, 217 (2002).
74 Jennifer O’Brien, Note, Putting a Face to a (Screen) Name:  The First Amend-
ment Implications of Compelling ISPs to Reveal the Identities of Anonymous Internet
Speakers in Online Defamation Cases , 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2745, 2748 (2002).
75 Lucy D. Lovrien, Cybersmear Litigation Through a Massachusetts Prism , 46
BOSTON B.J. 18, 20 (May/June 2002).
76 Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 45 (Pa. 2003).
77 See id.  at 51-52 (Cappy, J., concurring) (criticizing majority for reaching merits
issues).
78 Id.  at 43-44 & n.1.
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tual malice” standard in defamation claims.79  The Melvin  major-
ity addressed both the need for states to address the “evil” of
libel, as well as “the importance of anonymous political speech,”
and concluded that discovery of the defendant’s identity
“presents a significant possibility of trespass upon their First
Amendment rights.”80  While those comments by themselves do
little more than recognize the seriousness of the conflicting inter-
ests that the court must consider on remand, the Melvin  majority
gave a further hint of its views when it stated that resolution of
the discovery issue did not require “consideration of the merits
of the underlying defamation action.”81  Rather, the court held
that the relevant question was “strictly a legal one” of “what
threshold requirements must be imposed as a prerequisite to dis-
covery in an anonymous defamation case,” an “inquiry . . .
plainly separable from the defamation action.”82  The court
needed to reach this conclusion to satisfy Pennsylvania-specific
law concerning the availability of interlocutory appellate review,
but it raises difficult questions as to what standard should be ap-
plied on remand.  In particular, if the court literally means that
the trial judge should not consider the merits, it leaves the judge
little basis for weighing the competing interests that it acknowl-
edges exist.
Subpoena applications certainly continue to be fought, though
many are resolved at the trial level without published opinions.83
On the whole, though statistics are difficult to come by, there
appears to be a substantial reduction since Dendrite  in lawsuits
targeting anonymous Internet posters.  At the same time, how-
ever, other related areas of litigation are becoming more com-
mon, such as the record industry’s post-Napster suits against
computer users’ unauthorized downloading of copyrighted music
and video.
The reasons for the decline in defamation litigation against
anonymous Internet posters are subject to debate, but it is my
impression that it is a combination of the enhanced judicial scru-
tiny of these cases that culminated in Dendrite,  combined with
79 Id.  at 49-50 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964)).
80 Melvin , 836 A.2d at 49-50.
81 Id . at 46.
82 Id .
83 See, e.g. , Gallagher, supra  note 30 (discussing a report of trial judge denying R
discovery under Dendrite  test).
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significant societal changes that are mostly unrelated to what oc-
curs in the courtroom.  These reasons include:
• Heightened judicial scrutiny.  As ISPs began to require
court orders, and courts began to scrutinize subpoena ap-
plications, the cost of obtaining discovery was substantially
increased, even without the heightened Dendrite  standard.
I suspect that, particularly in the early days of “John Doe”
practice, many requests were made by lawyers on the as-
sumption that it would be cheap and easy to file a com-
plaint, without really thinking through the possible costs or
larger implications.  As courts began to require motion
practice, plaintiffs presumably became less interested in
seeking this discovery.  The significance of this factor was
increased by the Dendrite  ruling, which made clear that
obtaining simply the basic discovery that would permit a
plaintiff to commence its litigation would be burdensome,
expensive, and uncertain.
• The Internet culture of derision.  Efforts to commence
suits against Internet posters were often met with derision
on the very message boards that were the subject of the
lawsuits.  For example, after Dendrite commenced its suit,
one of the defendants posted the message, “If Dendrite
gets my info I’m coming onto this message board with all
the dirt about what just went on behind the walls of den-
drite. This could get real funny!  So funny that my lawyer
will sit on a beach for along [sic] time when I’m done with
them.  This is real funny since my IP is coming from a
cyber café.”84  Others also posted derisive messages,85
though some were supportive of the company.86
• The September 11 attacks.  September 11 may have re-
duced lawsuits aimed at Internet posters in two ways.
First, the shared public sense that some things no longer
seemed as important as they once seemed may have caused
potential plaintiffs to conclude that such claims, even if ac-
tionable, were no longer worth pursuing.87  Second, the
84 Posting of ajcazz, to Yahoo! Message Boards:  DRTE (June 27, 2000) (on file
with law review).
85 E.g. , Posting of Prgmr66, prgmr66@yahoo.com, to Yahoo! Message Boards:
DRTE (June 30, 2000) (“Egomaniac CEO’s can’t stand the fact that they can no
longer control the flow of information through press releases and analyst meetings
. . . . This lawsuit is a fishing expedition, nothing more.”) (on file with law review).
86 E.g. , Posting of Brian_McGovern2, to Yahoo! Message Boards:  DRTE (June
30, 2000) (on file with law review).
87 This hypothesis is necessarily speculative, although the author does have anec-
dotal experience suggesting that judges and litigants in some cases reevaluated the
merit or desirability of litigation in light of the terrorist attacks.  If this hypothesis
has merit, then, in an odd sense, plaintiffs’ perceptions might have “caught up” with
the Dendrite  court.  However, as the resilient American culture seems to be shifting
back to pre-9/11 norms, this effect may be short-lived.  More broadly, the problem
with the Dendrite  decision, as discussed below, is not whether the court is right in
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challenges to civil liberties raised by the government’s re-
sponse to 9/11 may have affected broader views of privacy
and governmental intrusions into anonymity, although how
that would affect potential plaintiffs’ decisions whether to
sue is more difficult to say.
• The stock market crash.  Beginning in March 2000, the
stock market began a long downward slide.  While some
losses have been made up, there has been no return to the
so-called “irrational exuberance” of the late 1990s.  The re-
sulting return to a greater emphasis on fundamentals, and
the concomitantly smaller role of rumor, in determining
stock prices may have decreased the incentive for corpora-
tions to bring such actions.  At the same time, reduced
stock market valuations and recession have on the whole
made companies more reluctant to incur legal fees that
may be perceived as non-essential.
While the kind of Internet bulletin board postings that inspired
the first round of John Doe litigation may be abating, technologi-
cal and market developments may lead to lawsuits in other areas
that raise the same issues.  One prominent example is the hun-
dreds or thousands of lawsuits commenced by copyright holders
in 2003 against individuals alleged to be illegally sharing digital
music over the Internet.  Reportedly, the Recording Industry As-
sociation of America, a music industry trade group, was ob-
taining 75 new subpoenas per day by mid-2003 to identify online
music sharers—so many that one federal court reported that the
requests were overwhelming court personnel.88  These subpoenas
were directed at various large ISPs and universities.89  Mirroring
to some extent the uncertainty over subpoenas relating to mes-
sage board postings, some ISPs complied voluntarily with these
subpoenas, while others objected.90  In December 2003, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or-
dered subpoenas quashed on statutory grounds under the Digital
some instance as to whether a particular suit should be brought, but whether that
decision is to be made by a court or a plaintiff.
88 Ted Bridis, Music Industry Wins Approval of Subpoenas , ASSOCIATED PRESS,
July 19, 2003, available at  2003 WL 59744114.
89 Id .
90 Recording Indus. Ass’n of America v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229,
1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also  Jay Lindsay, Schools Call Music-Use Subpoenas Ille-
gal , ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 23, 2003 (noting that Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and Boston College seek to quash subpoenas, while Northeastern University
complies), available at  2003 WL59745296; SBC Sues to Halt Music Industry Subpoe-
nas , YAHOO! NEWS, July 31, 2003 (reporting that RIAA official claims that “every”
ISP other than SBC (and presumably Verizon) had complied with subpoenas) (on
file with law review).
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Millennium Copyright Act,91 without reaching the resisting ISP’s
constitutional (including First Amendment) arguments against
the subpoenas.92
Another area of likely expansion for this kind of action is the
rise of so-called weblogs (“blogs”).  Discussed in Part II.A. be-
low, blogs present many of the same opportunities for mischief as
bulletin boards, but blogs can be much more influential and,
therefore, much more dangerous if misused. Other possible uses
of discovery to identify individuals acting anonymously on the
Internet include suits to identify and recover from spammers,
creators of viruses and worms, and others who use Internet tech-
nology destructively.93  As technology develops, it is reasonable
to expect that other opportunities for anonymous mischief will
develop.  In some regards, the fact that Internet message board
cases are likely to become a smaller proportion of John Doe
cases makes it more, not less, important that courts “get it
right”—because, unmoored, the doctrine developed in this area
can metastasize and cause greater harm.
II
A DELICATE BALANCE: THE POWERFUL PROMISE AND RISKS
OF ANONYMOUS INTERNET SPEECH
A. The Internet Is Beginning to Fulfill Its Promise of
Empowering Individual Speakers
In a period of less than a decade, the Internet has gone from a
promising new technology to a mature technology that has a
profound daily impact on the information available to citizens.
Advocates of limiting discovery of the identity of John Doe de-
fendants have argued, “[T]he Internet is a democratic institution
in the fullest sense. It serves as the modern equivalent of Speak-
ers’ Corner in England’s Hyde Park, where ordinary people may
voice their opinions, however silly, profane, or brilliant they may
be, to all who choose to listen.”94  Of course, the sheer volume of
91 17 U.S.C. § 512(h) (2003).
92 Recording Indus ., 351 F.3d at 1231.
93 The problems of spam, worms, and viruses are unfortunately well known to
most Internet users.  The need for legal action to address these problems is sug-
gested by the increasing aggressiveness of individuals using these techniques, includ-
ing Internet denial-of-service attacks reportedly directed by spammers at websites
designed to combat spam. See  Elinor Mills Abreu, Anti-Spam Web Pages Shut
Down by Attacks , YAHOO! NEWS, Sept. 25, 2003 (on file with law review).
94 Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation, and Electronic Privacy
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posts does not prove that these messages are being read.  As
Timothy Burke has argued, the principal barrier to being heard
on the Internet is not the ability to speak, but the ability to say
something that others want to hear—“most people don’t have
much to say, and what they do have to say, they say badly.”95
While much Internet speech no doubt goes unread, some
speech has had a major impact.  Not only do essentially all major
news outlets, political parties, and organizations have an Internet
presence, but, to an extent that is unprecedented in the modern
era, individuals who are neither professional journalists nor per-
sonally involved in events of public importance have been able to
significantly affect the development of the public’s understanding
of significant issues.
An early example of the power of the Internet to spread infor-
mation was the rapid rise to prominence of Matthew Drudge.
Drudge, who maintains an Internet news and gossip site, The
Drudge Report , achieved significant attention, and likely altered
the course of major political events, when in January 1998 he
posted information that Newsweek  had developed, but chosen
not to publish, concerning Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, a
story that was rapidly picked up by mainstream television and
newspaper outlets.96  The “most dramatic symbol of the emer-
gence of cyberspace as a major media force,” Drudge had “gone
from anonymity to his own Fox News Channel show.”97  By the
2000 presidential election, Drudge was acting as a recognized (if
not entirely praised) news source, posting exit poll information
before traditional news organizations did so.98
As described above, bloggers Atrios, Joshua Micah Marshall,
and Andrew Sullivan had a significant role in focusing public at-
tention on controversial remarks by Trent Lott that led to his
Information Center as Amici Curiae at 5, Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003)
(Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002).  The analogy, however, elides the fact that
speakers in Hyde Park appear personally in public and, thus, do not generally rely
on anonymity.
95 Timothy Burke, It ’s Content, Stupid:  Why the “Digital Divide” Is a Red Her-
ring , at  http://www.swarthmore.edu/socsci/tburke1/digitaldivide.html.
96 See  Dan Balz, Washington’s Extraordinary Week; How the Events Unfolded,
From Jones to Lewinsky , WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at A1.
97 Mark Jurkowitz, Caught in the Muddle:  The Big Media Story of ’98 Was How
the Messengers Were the Message , BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 1998, at C1.
98 E.g. , Drew Jubera, Web Sites Defy Ban on Early Results Release , ATLANTA J. &
CONST., Nov. 8, 2000, at A9.
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resignation as Senate Minority Leader in December 2002.99
Also, in 2003 and 2004, substantial public concern arose concern-
ing the issue of computerized voting and whether the systems in-
volved were adequately protected from fraud.  Bills were
introduced into both Houses of Congress to address this problem
by requiring computerized voting machines to provide a paper
trail, assuring that election results can, if necessary, be audited.100
Beverly Harris, a publicist with “no journalistic experience,”101
discovered a great deal of information suggesting that there were
substantial security concerns involving computerized voting and
posted this information to her web site, titled Black Box Voting:
Ballot-Tampering in the 21st Century .102  As a result, Harris was
“singularly responsible for almost every bit of attention recently
paid to electronic voting machines.”103
In addition, web sites such as greedyassociates.com, vault.com,
and ratemyprofessors.com provide “inside” information from
anonymous individuals within law firms, businesses, and universi-
ties.  While not affecting general public discourse in the manner
of Drudge, Atrios, Marshall, Sullivan, or Harris, these sites can
provide significant information for individuals interested in par-
ticular companies.
While many individuals do choose to use their name in pub-
lishing Internet speech, others choose not to, with little or no ap-
parent negative effect on the persuasiveness of their opinions.
Indeed, it is possible that by publishing anonymously, individuals
can increase their persuasiveness.104
99 See supra  note 17 and accompanying text. R
100 Secure and Verifiable Electronic Voting Act of 2004, S. 2045, 108th Cong.
(2004); Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003, H.R. 2239, 108th
Cong. (2003).
101 Farhad Manjoo, Will the Election Be Hacked? , SALON.COM, Feb. 9, 2004, at
http://salon.com/tech/feature/2004/02/09/voting_machines/index_np.html.
102 http://www.blackboxvoting.com.  Harris is no longer affiliated with this site,
but runs http://blackboxvoting.org.
103 Manjoo, supra note 101.
104 That is not to say that anonymous speakers generally achieve the level of per-
suasiveness that a prominent public figure may have, but an ordinary citizen speak-
ing anonymously may add credibility because it allows the reader to imagine
expertise or access to information that may not exist or because it shields the reader
from information that may cause the reader to discount the speech. Cf.  Randall P.
Bezanson, Speaking Through Others ’ Voices:  Authorship, Originality, and Free
Speech , 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 983, 1067 (2003) (“Speaker’s identity is itself part
of the meaning of a message.”).  While Atrios claimed he was really just “[s]ome guy
in Philadelphia who runs a weblog,” his influence and readership might have been
increased by people believing he was “‘somebody’—which I think means somebody
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There are numerous ways for an individual to publish his or
her views anonymously on the Internet.  One of the oldest and
most common is the Internet bulletin board or message board,105
which allows users to post messages on a particular topic in a sort
of running conversation that is, in most cases, publicly viewable.
(There are also private message boards.)  Such message boards
are devoted to a broad range of topics, but for purposes of litiga-
tion the most important are usually those devoted to particular
publicly-traded companies.  For example, Yahoo! maintains a
message board for every publicly-traded company in the United
States.  Yahoo!’s Microsoft board alone has over three-quarters
of a million posts.106  Another prominent provider of message
board services, Raging Bull, has over 140,000 posts for
Microsoft.107
More recently, as described above, blogs have become a com-
mon medium and, for some, an effective means of spreading in-
formation on the Internet.108  Moreover, blogs and other web
sites can be linked directly to users interested in the information
they offer through use of the advertising features of search en-
gines such as Google and Yahoo!.109  A large number of influen-
tial blogs are anonymous.110  As noted above, individuals may
in politics or media outside of this weblog.”  Posting of Atrios, supra  note 18.  In R
fact, Atrios is “some guy in Philadelphia” with a Ph.D. in economics, see supra  note
4, but he rarely posts concerning his area of academic expertise.
105 See, e.g. , CompuServe Gateway Provides Subscribers with Link to Internet , PC
WK., Sept. 25, 1989, at 10.
106 Yahoo! Message Board:  MSFT, at  http://messages.yahoo.com/?action=q&
board=MSFT (last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
107 Raging Bull, at  http://ragingbull.lycos.com/mboard/boards.cgi?board=msft
(last visited Feb. 1, 2005).
108 See supra  notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
109 For example, a non-profit group protesting environmental harm caused by
cruise ships buys advertising from search engines to provide links to its site to users
interested in cruises, though Google decided to reject the advertisements. See Envi-
ronmental Group ’s Ads Banned from Google Site , S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2004, at B3.
110 See supra  notes 1-16 and accompanying text.  Other prominent anonymous
bloggers have included Hesiod, who removed his site and archives in November
2004. See  Posting of LarryE, to whoviating.blogspot.com (Nov. 4, 2004), at  http://
whoviating.blogspot.com/2004_11_01_whoviating_archive.html#109961071446705
845. Also, there is Captain Ed, whose Captain’s Quarters, www.captainsquarters
blog.com, is among the top-rated blogs according to the independent rankings com-
piled by the anonymous N.Z. Bear at http://www.truthlaidbear.com/ecosystem.php.
Underneath Their Robes, an anonymous legal blog published under the name “Arti-
cle III Groupie,” receives 1,500 hits a day and has been mentioned in Newsweek ,
The Legal Intelligencer , and the ABA Journal . See  Howard J. Bashman, Law-Re-
lated Blogs Can Provide Welcome and Even Worthwhile Diversion, LEGAL INTELLI-
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seek to remain anonymous for personal or security reasons, but
anonymity can also create a perception of reliability111 or greater
(insider) knowledge. While it appears that companies have not
yet figured out how to use blogs productively in marketing, they
are attracting attention.  The failure to succeed in using blogs for
commercial advertising may simply be the result of advertisers’
allowing it to be known that advertising was their purpose, rather
than using blogs surreptitiously.112  The power of anonymous
conduct on the Web has also been highlighted by the recent phe-
nomenon of “flash mobs,” where an individual (often anony-
mous) can influence dozens or hundreds of people to arrive at
one place simultaneously for no particular reason, creating a
“mob.”113
B. Defamation, Fraud, and Anonymous Mischief on
the Internet
While large companies tend to attract a large number of posts
to Internet message boards, the risk of manipulation is greatest
among smaller and more thinly-traded companies.114  A common
and, perhaps surprisingly, often-effective stock manipulation
scheme is the use of pseudonyms to post false information about
a company to a bulletin board or to disseminate similar mislead-
ing information by anonymous spam e-mails.  In one case, the
president and CEO of Save the Air, a small, publicly-traded com-
pany, concerned that the company’s stock price was being ad-
versely affected by negative postings on the company’s Raging
Bull message board, arranged for a public relations consultant to
post thirty-seven anonymous messages on the board in an effort
GENCER, Dec. 13, 2004, at 7; Stephanie Francis Ward, To Blog or Not to Blog?: Some
Associates Who Asked That Question Say Web Logs Advance Careers, Exposure , 90
A.B.A. J. 33 (Dec. 2004).
111 Lance Concannon, Like Falling Off a Blog , INTERNET MAG., Aug. 1, 2003, at
13 (“Maybe it’s because you can be a little more honest in a blog — it’s easier to lay
your soul bare to some anonymous reader than the people you deal with in daily
life.”).
112 See , e.g. , Thom Weidlich, Internet—Weblogs:  Windows of Marketing Opportu-
nities , PR WK. June 2, 2003, at 24 (“[B]loggers may be open to PR pitches, and their
growing influence makes them the perfect viral marketing medium.”).
113 See  Sam Skolnik, They Came, and in a Flash, They Were Gone Seattle Adopts
Latest Mob Mentality , SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 16, 2003, at B1.
114 See, e.g. , United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287, 1288 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
relative ease of manipulating thinly-traded securities).
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to boost the stock price.115 In another case, a professional In-
ternet spammer was found to have helped various stock issuers
and promoters inflate their stock prices through millions of anon-
ymous e-mails containing false information.116 While promoting
one’s own stock seems to be more common than falsely attacking
competitors, there are also instances of the latter.  For example,
the chief executive officer of La Jolla Club, a golf club company,
posted more than one hundred anonymous negative messages
about competitor Callaway Golf Company while actively trading
in Callaway’s shares.117  The Callaway Golf case is one of hun-
dreds of cases of abuse, many leading to “significant”
consequences.118
In addition to insider schemes, Internet bulletin boards and e-
mail can allow an individual to manipulate a stock’s price for
profit.  The Securities and Exchange Commission described a
typical scheme as follows:
Hogan used the same technique for each stock manipulation.
First, Hogan accumulated a substantial position in the stock of
a company quoted on the NASDAQ OTC Bulletin Board. Ho-
gan then, after the close of the market and through the open-
ing of the market the following trading day, used alias screen
names to post hundreds of messages about the targeted Bulle-
tin Board company on Internet message boards and sent nu-
merous e-mails with the identical message. The spam postings
and e-mails falsely claimed that a well-known “blue chip”
company would soon acquire the outstanding stock of the
targeted company at a substantial premium over its current
market price. The spam postings and e-mails prompted a surge
in the price and volume of the targeted company’s stock. Ho-
gan then liquidated his position, selling into the buying surge
he created.119
In recent years, the SEC has identified numerous similar
schemes.120  Presumably, many others remain undetected.121
115 In re  Wilson, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 8042, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2627,
at *3-4 (Dec. 19, 2001).
116 SEC v. Meltzer, Litigation Release No. 17,985, 2003 SEC LEXIS 392 (Feb. 19,
2003).
117 A.J. Cataldo & Larry N. Killough, Is Your Firm Safe from Cybersmear? , 84
STRATEGIC FIN. 34, 36 (2003).
118 Id . at 38 (describing twelve of “approximately 200 cases” collected at Silicon
Investor’s website, www.siliconinvestor.com/stocktalk/msg.gsp?msgid=15828446).
119 SEC v. Hogan, Litigation Release No. 17,769, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2532, at *1-2
(Oct. 7, 2002).
120 See, e.g. , SEC v. Thomassen, Litigation Release No. 18,137, 2003 SEC LEXIS
1149, at *1-2 (May 14, 2003) (using false statements in spam and message boards,
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The shield of anonymity can also be a substantial aid to tor-
tious conduct outside the context of the financial markets.  In
one case, a twenty-five year-old resident of Pakistan was accused
of defrauding U.S. merchants of three million dollars in com-
puter equipment purchased with credit card numbers obtained
by establishing fraudulent “auctions at sites such as Yahoo! and
eBay.”122  In one case, a fraudulent “National Do Not E-mail
Registry” was created to appear like the Federal Trade Commis-
sion’s National Do Not Call Registry, with the apparent purpose
to fraudulently obtain e-mail and other personal information.123
In another, anonymous individuals secretly videotaped varsity
athletes in their locker rooms and sold the tapes over the In-
ternet.124 Ordinary fraud and computerized sabotage are two
common forms of misconduct that occur with regularity, costing
businesses billions of dollars annually.125  Consumers reported
Internet fraud losses to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
in 2003 of $200 million (not to mention other fraud that undoubt-
edly was not reported).126  Similarly, harassment among teenag-
private investor earned 32%-132% profits on various “microcap” companies); In re
Snyder, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 46,108, File No. 3-10811, 2002
SEC LEXIS 1619, at *2, *4-5 (June 25, 2002) (instituting proceedings against a teen-
ager who unsuccessfully sought to manipulate stock of biotech company through
anonymous postings); Press Release from Thom Mrozek, Public Affairs Officer,
U.S. Attorney’s Office, No. 99-260 (Dec. 15, 1999) (on file with author) (announcing
charges arising from false anonymous postings about reverse merger, which drove
stock from 13 cents to $15.50 a share, resulting in $370,000 in illegal profits).
121 Depending on the nature of the false information posted, victims may be more
or less likely to realize that a fraud was committed and report it to authorities.  Even
if a scheme comes to the attention of authorities, limited resources may interfere
with enforcement action.
122 Daniele Micci-Barreca, Unawed by Fraud:  New Techniques and Technologies
Have Been Enlisted in the Fight Against Online Fraud , SECURITY MANAGEMENT,
Sept. 1, 2003, at 75.
123 Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Sham Site Is a Scam:  There Is No
“National Do Not E-mail Registry” (Feb. 12, 2004), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2004/02/spamcam.htm.
124 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).  The “Doe” in this case name
refers to the victims, who sued anonymously to protect their privacy, rather than the
unknown defendants.  The court notes, however, that the anonymous wrongdoers
could not be located, and the judgment against them was uncollectible. Id.  at 656-
57.
125 See , e.g. , VERISIGN, INTERNET SECURITY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING 1, 4, 8, 13-
15 (2004), available at  http://www.verisign.com/static/005573.pdf; Micci-Barreca,
supra  note 122; Alison Langley, Computer Viruses Are Frustrating Insurers, Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2003, sec. 3, at 4.
126 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS IN FRAUD &
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ers appears to be relatively common.127  Depending on the
circumstances, such harassment can be actionable, a violation of
school rules, or even criminal.
The First Amendment does not immunize anonymous speech
over the Internet that constitutes libel, defamation, or other vio-
lations of the law from liability.128  The general right to speak
anonymously on the Internet is substantially different from the
asserted right to remain anonymous when anonymity is being
used as a shield protecting tortious or illegal conduct.  The rapid-
ity with which false information, trade secrets, and the like can be
spread over the Internet creates a serious hazard, a hazard which
must be weighed in determining the proper judicial approach to
these situations.
III
SPECIAL LIMITATIONS ON DISCOVERABILITY ARE NOT
REQUIRED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
SPEAK ANONYMOUSLY
The core concern underlying both Dendrite  and the organized
opposition to discovery of the identities of John Doe defendants
is rooted in the First Amendment right of free speech.  The Den-
drite  court, for example, expressly relied upon “the well-estab-
lished First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”129
Likewise, Public Citizen’s central argument in Dendrite  in sup-
port of a heightened standard was based on the assertion that
“[i]t is well-established that the First Amendment protects the
right to speak anonymously.”130 Melvin , too, framed the issue as
“what threshold requirements must be imposed as a prerequisite
to discovery in an anonymous defamation case in order to imple-
ment essential First Amendment protections.”131 Melvin , how-
IDENTITY THEFT, JANUARY - DECEMBER 2003, at 3 (Jan. 22, 2004), available at  http:/
/www.consumer.gov/sentinel/pubs/topicfraud.2003.pdf.
127 See, e.g. , Ethan Smith, An Online Rumor Ruined My Life , YM, April 2002, at
193, 194 (discussing posts on unofficial student message board that referred to high
school student as “fat cow MOO BITCH” and stated that poster would kill student
“if he knew that he wouldn’t get caught”).
128 See, e.g. , CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994).
129 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
130 Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen and the American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey at 22, Dendrite Int’l Inc. v. John Does Nos. 1 through 4 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001) (No. A-2774-00), available at  http://www.citizen. org/litigation/
briefs/1stAmendment/articles.cfm?ID=1862.
131 Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46 (Pa. 2003).
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ever, also recognized that “the cases dealing with the right to
anonymous free speech have been decided by the United States
Supreme Court in the context of regulatory bans on handbills
and have not been applied in the area of libel suits against public
officials.”132  Thus, Melvin  reasoned, the First Amendment is rel-
evant, but what it commands remains to be decided.133  While
case-specific objections not based on the First Amendment to the
use of discovery to identify defendants may exist in particular
instances,134 those objections hardly justify systematic, judicially-
imposed restraints on discovery, as demonstrated by the fact that
discovery of defendants’ identities has been routinely granted
when speech was not involved.135
Recognizing the existence of a First Amendment right to speak
anonymously, however, is the beginning, not the end, of analysis
of what guidelines should govern the discovery of a John Doe
defendant’s identity.  As set forth in Part IV, existing procedural
rules provide substantial protection to defendants who wish to
avoid disclosure of their identities.  For example, in the ordinary
case, disclosure will be unavailable if the plaintiff has failed to
plead an actionable claim against the defendant, or if the defen-
dant can establish entitlement to summary judgment.  Likewise,
the court’s control of discovery will permit the court to issue pro-
tective orders protecting defendant from much extra-judicial re-
taliation and otherwise limiting use of the information
discovered, without ordering that the discovery not be had in
cases where it is essential to plaintiff’s case.  The real question,
then, is whether the First Amendment requires courts systemati-
cally to impose different, and greater, impediments against the
discovery of the identity of John Doe defendants than are im-
posed for the discovery of other relevant materials.
132 Id.  at 50.
133 See id.
134 For example, discovery of a defendant’s identity may be improper where a
claim is patently without merit or is brought for an improper purpose.  However,
these concerns could exist regardless of whether the defendant’s conduct was alleged
to involve speech.
135 See, e.g. , Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 390 n.2 (1971) (reversing dismissal of complaint and reporting, without
criticism, that defendant narcotics agents had not been named in complaint and dis-
trict court had ordered service of that process through the agency upon those whom
records indicated were involved in plaintiff’s arrest); Dry Branch Kaolin Co. v. Doe,
622 A.2d 1320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Brien v. Lomazow, 547 A.2d 318
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
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As a general matter, the First Amendment does not require
such special procedures.  In reaching this conclusion, this Article
does not claim that individuals posting anonymously on the In-
ternet lack any interest in maintaining their anonymity, nor does
it claim that that interest should be ignored by the courts.
Rather, it claims that the discovery of John Does’ identities
under existing rules is consistent with existing First Amendment
jurisprudence, and that the First Amendment does not require
special discovery rules to be established.  In particular, while the
Supreme Court has not considered directly the application of the
First Amendment right to speak anonymously to restrictions on
discovery in civil litigation,136 two categories of cases decided by
the Court do provide insight into the scope of the right to speak
anonymously and its relevance in the present context.  First, the
Court has directly articulated the right to speak anonymously in
the context of prior governmental restraints on speech.137  Sec-
ond, the Court has considered claims of anonymity as a basis for
opposing after-the-fact discovery of a person’s identity in the
context of governmental criminal and legislative investiga-
tions.138  Both of these lines of cases are helpful but imperfect
analogies to the problem of John Doe discovery, and the Su-
preme Court has not affirmatively recognized a right to speak
anonymously outside these contexts.  Taken together, these cases
suggest that the First Amendment is relevant to John Doe discov-
ery requests, but that those anonymous free speech concerns may
be satisfied by ordinary procedural rules.139
A. The Supreme Court and Anonymity
1. The Prior Restraint Cases
An often-repeated idea is that anonymous speech has through-
out history “played an important role in the progress of man-
kind.”140  This sentiment, which often relies upon the
136 See Melvin , 836 A.2d at 50.
137 See infra  Part III.A.1.
138 See infra  Part III.A.2.
139 See infra  Parts III.B, IV.
140 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62 n.3, 64 (1960); see also McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 n.4, 343 n.6 (1995); cf. id . at 358-71 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (examining practice in 1791 to conclude that “original meaning” of
Constitution was to protect anonymous speech).  Justice Scalia has expressed skepti-
cism of this positive view of anonymous speech. McIntyre , 514 U.S. at 385 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“I can imagine no reason why an anonymous leaflet is any more
honorable, as a general matter, than an anonymous phone call or an anonymous
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pseudonymous Federalist Papers for support,141 seems accurate
as far as it goes.  The Supreme Court first expressly recognized a
First Amendment right to speak anonymously in 1960, in Talley
v. California , which invalidated a local ordinance requiring hand-
bills to disclose the names of their creator and distributor.142
Since that time, the Supreme Court has revisited the issue a num-
ber of times, though each time in the context of prior restraints
on speech143—i.e., a governmental command that “forbid[s]” or,
at a minimum, imposes a “legal impediment” to “future
speech.”144
Because “the First Amendment historically provides greater
protection from prior restraints than after-the-fact penalties,”145
the Supreme Court’s anonymous speech cases cannot be directly
translated into the John Doe context, and blanket invocation of
the “First Amendment right to speak anonymously” may be mis-
letter.  It facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability, which is ordinarily the very
purpose of the anonymity.”).
141 E.g. , Talley , 362 U.S. at 64-65; Fed. Election Comm’n v. Machinists Non-Parti-
san Political League, 655 F.2d 380, 388 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bezanson, supra  note
104, at 1067 n.292.
142 362 U.S. 60 (1960).  A few prior decisions had addressed related issues, but
had not framed their analysis in terms of a distinct, First Amendment right to speak
anonymously.  For example, NAACP v. Alabama , 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Bates v.
City of Little Rock , 361 U.S. 516 (1960), had overturned laws requiring the disclo-
sure of the names of members of the NAACP, but had done so on due process
grounds, although the Bates  concurrence (two weeks before Talley) had stated that
the ordinance also violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech
and assembly.  361 U.S. at 527-28 (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring).  Likewise,
the Court had rejected laws prohibiting speech without prior governmental approval
on general First Amendment grounds, without addressing the narrower considera-
tion that an approval requirement could effectively prevent anonymous speech (at
least as long as the approval process required disclosure of the speaker’s identity).
See, e.g. , Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
143 See  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Am.
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
144 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 549-51 (1993).  There can be a blur-
ring at the margins of the distinction between prior restraints and subsequent pun-
ishment. Id.  at 567-68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“A historical example is the
sentence imposed on Hugh Singleton in 1579 after he had enraged Elizabeth I by
printing a certain tract . . . .  Singleton was condemned to lose his right hand, thus
visiting upon him both a punishment and a disability encumbering all further print-
ing.”).  However, as discussed infra , all the cases in which the Supreme Court has
found the right to speak anonymously involved government regulation that either
forbade future anonymous speech outright or forbade it unless certain pre-condi-
tions were satisfied by the speaker.
145 BE & K Constr. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 536 U.S. 516, 530 (2002).
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leading.146  Rather, the relevance of the First Amendment efforts
to identify defendants requires analysis of the reasoning of the
Supreme Court’s anonymous speech jurisprudence.  As de-
scribed below, the Supreme Court has unambiguously recognized
a right to speak anonymously in four cases.  However, in each,
the Court recognized limitations on that right.  Moreover, in
other circumstances it has required disclosure of the speaker’s
identity as a condition to expressive conduct.
In recognizing for the first time a specific right to speak anony-
mously, the Talley  majority conceived of the right as derivative
of the core First Amendment prohibition against restraints on
speech.147  This conceptual approach was not the only one open
to the Court.  Rather, it could have treated the right to speak
anonymously as an independently protected right to choose the
content of one’s speech, analytically separate from the issue of
whether the disclosure could deter speech;148 or it could have
treated the disclosure requirement as an impermissible effort to
require speech against the speaker’s wishes;149 or it could have
analyzed the question from a historical perspective, as Justice
Thomas has more recently urged.150  Instead, the Court took as
its starting point prior decisions holding that it violated the First
Amendment to prohibit the distribution of handbills, which were
the particular form of speech at issue in Talley .151  Relying on
those precedents, the Court explained that an ordinance prohib-
iting anonymous handbills was clearly an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech, unless it was “saved” by its provision that
146 See, e.g. , Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001).
147 See Talley , 362 U.S. at 62.
148 This perspective was suggested by the majority in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm ’n , 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author’s decision to remain anonymous,
like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publica-
tion, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.”).  In
contrast, the Talley dissent explicitly considered and rejected a right to speak anony-
mously, stating that “[t]he Constitution says nothing about freedom of anonymous
speech.”  362 U.S. at 70 (Clark, J., dissenting).  The dissent went on to cite instances
in which the Court had approved restrictions on anonymous speech, including laws
requiring newspapers using the mails to identify their editor, publisher, owner, and
stockholders, and requiring lobbyists to provide their identity and other information.
Id . (citing Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913) and United States v.
Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)).
149 See  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 573-75
(1995).
150 See McIntyre , 514 U.S. at 358-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151 362 U.S. at 62-63.
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handbills could be distributed if the author was identified.152  The
Court held that the ordinance was not saved, reasoning that re-
quired identification “would tend to restrict freedom to dis-
tribute information,” as evidenced by what it found to be the
substantial and positive use of anonymity to promote various
ideas throughout history.153  In addition, and of particular rele-
vance to John Doe discovery, the Court emphasized that the or-
dinance was not limited to “providing a way to identify those
responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel,”154 implying
that an ordinance targeted at identifying such wrongdoers after
the fact could survive First Amendment scrutiny.
After Talley , the Court did not revisit the issue of the right to
speak anonymously until 1995, but since then it has done so three
times.  These cases, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission ,155
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. ,156 and
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton ,157 while
stating that they apply “strict” or “exacting” scrutiny of restric-
tions on anonymous speech, have nonetheless recognized the
propriety of limitations that are closely targeted toward wrong-
doers.  First, McIntyre  invalidated an Ohio statute prohibiting
the distribution of anonymous campaign literature.  The Court
reasoned that Ohio’s interest in regulating the voting process did
not justify the statute158 because “the ordinance plainly applies
even when there is no hint of falsity or libel.”159  The Court fur-
ther explained that the blanket anonymity prohibition compared
unfavorably with the state’s existing, and better-targeted, regula-
tion of fraud and libel in elections, and, “[t]o the extent those
provisions may be underinclusive, [state] courts [may] also en-
force the common-law tort of defamation.”160 McIntyre  thus rec-
ognized that common-law defamation claims provide an essential
safeguard protecting the public against the risk of abuse inherent
in the right to speak anonymously.  Unlike blanket prior restric-
152 Id . at 63-64.
153 Id . at 64-65.
154 Id . at 64.  (“Counsel has urged that this ordinance is aimed at providing a way
to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising and libel.  Yet the ordinance
is in no manner so limited.”).
155 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
156 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
157 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
158 514 U.S. at 344-45.
159 Id.  at 344.
160 Id.  at 351 n.13.
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tions against anonymous speech, common-law claims are
targeted at actionable speech, rather than speech generally.161
While McIntyre  does not address the issue of the discovery of the
identity of defamation defendants, the very defamation actions
the Court invoked cannot serve their function of deterring and
punishing wrongdoing—and thus of allowing anonymous speech
to be protected when it is not actionable—unless defendants can
be identified.
Four years later, in Buckley , the Court again held that disclo-
sure requirements are unconstitutional when they threaten broad
restraints on speech unrelated to legitimate governmental inter-
ests, but that disclosures that impose only limited impediments to
speech may be acceptable when they advance legitimate inter-
ests.  In particular, Buckley  held unconstitutional a Colorado
statute that required election initiative petition circulators to
wear identification badges, but approved a law requiring that the
circulators file as a public record an identifying affidavit that re-
vealed their name and other personal information.162  As Justice
Ginsberg explained, the affidavit requirement, by separating the
identification in time from the speech, strikes an acceptable bal-
ance between the First Amendment right of the circulator to
speak without “‘heat of the moment’ harassment” and the legiti-
mate state interest in regulating elections.163  While suggesting
that the affidavits are less likely  to lead to harassment than iden-
tity badges, Buckley  thus accepts the possibility that forced dis-
closure of a person’s identity as a condition of political speech,
when justified by legitimate governmental interests, may be ac-
ceptable even if there is a risk of private retaliation.  For exam-
ple, since Buckley  approved the filing of affidavits as a public
record, a private company could, without First Amendment re-
striction, obtain copies of the affidavits of all petition circulators
opposing it on a political issue (say, location of an incinerator in
a particular neighborhood) and then terminate any employees
(or vendors) found among the circulators.  The deterrent to
speech of the possibility of discovery in a John Doe case is thus
substantially less than what the First Amendment permits.  For
example, in Melvin ,164 the plaintiff judge seeking to discover the
161 Id.  at 349-50 & n.13.
162 525 U.S. 182, 197-200 (1999).
163 Id . at 199-200.
164 836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003).
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identity of the person accusing her of misconduct could constitu-
tionally have obtained the identity of the same person circulating
a petition to remove her from office on the same grounds (if per-
mitted by state statute).
Finally, in Watchtower , the Court considered for the first time
the extent to which prior disclosure requirements are permissible
in a context not involving election regulation.  In Watchtower , Je-
hovah’s Witnesses challenged a local ordinance that required
canvassers, solicitors, merchants, and others going onto private
property to obtain a “Solicitation Permit,” which required the
canvasser to provide information including name, address, cer-
tain prior addresses, and various categories of information about
the purpose and scope of the proposed canvassing or solicita-
tion.165  While the ordinance allowed permits to be denied on
certain grounds (e.g., fraud or incomplete forms), permits were
issued routinely,166 and the ordinance itself was “content neu-
tral.”167  The Court, while recognizing the “important inter-
ests”168 advanced by the ordinance, held that it nonetheless
violated the First Amendment in light of the “breadth of speech
affected” and the “nature of the regulation.”169  Again, the
Court’s reasoning depended critically on the fact that disclosure
was required prior to speech:
It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First
Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in
the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first
inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors
and then obtain a permit to do so.170
Moreover, the Court was concerned that the ordinance would
deter legitimate speech, and was not targeted at actionable
speech.  In particular, the Court recognized that “preclusion [of
speech] may well be justified in some situations—for example, by
the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a ballot-
initiative process . . . or by the interest in preventing fraudulent
commercial transactions.”171  Indeed, “[h]ad this provision been
construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicita-
165 536 U.S. 150, 154-55 & n.2 (2002).
166 Id . at 154-56 & n.4.
167 Id . at 159.
168 Id . at 165.
169 Id . at 164.
170 Id . at 165-66.
171 Id . at 167.
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tion of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored
to the Village’s interest in protecting the privacy of its residents
and preventing fraud.”172  Taken as a whole, Watchtower  is prob-
ably the broadest protection to date of the right to speak anony-
mously, but even under Watchtower  restrictions focused
specifically on deterring specific wrongs remain viable.  There-
fore, even Watchtower  provides little support for the imposition
of greater discovery hurdles in defamation cases beyond the gen-
eral principle that the right to speak anonymously warrants First
Amendment protection.
Moreover, while Talley , McIntyre , Buckley , and Watchtower
address the right to speak anonymously most directly, the Court
has also continued to uphold prior restrictions on anonymous
speech.  For example, in Valeo , the Court recognized that the
Federal Election Campaign Act’s forced disclosure of the iden-
tity of contributors to political campaigns might “seriously in-
fringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First
Amendment.”173  Nonetheless, the Court held that the broad dis-
closure requirements (requiring identification of contributors do-
nating as little as ten dollars) were justified by the subordinating
governmental interests in providing the public with information
about the sources and uses of campaign funds, deterring corrup-
tion, and enforcing contribution limits.174  In Meese v. Keene , the
Court (writing through Justice Stevens, the author of Watch-
tower) upheld a federal statute requiring “agents of foreign prin-
cipals” to disclose identifying information and to make detailed
disclosures to the government when disseminating information
classified by the State Department as “political propaganda.”175
The Court has also approved disclosure requirements in banking
transactions176 and has reiterated its pre-Talley approval of the
Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act’s prohibiting anonymous
lobbying of Congress.177
Taken together, these cases establish that the right to speak
172 Id . at 165.
173 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
174 Id.  at 63, 66-68; see generally id.  at 60-84.
175 481 U.S. 465, 467-69 (1987).  The Court in Keene  did not address the right to
speak anonymously specifically, focusing instead on whether the First Amendment
prohibited the requirement that the disseminator of material classified as political
propaganda was required to label it as such. Id . at 477-84.
176 See  Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
177 E.g. , Valeo , 424 U.S. at 67 n.79.
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anonymously does exist independent of the right to speak gener-
ally (despite Justice Scalia’s continuing skepticism).  In particu-
lar, they establish that, absent countervailing considerations, it is
desirable to permit anonymous speech, and, therefore, the First
Amendment restricts government interference with the right to
speak anonymously.  As with the right to speak generally, the
First Amendment provides its greatest protections when the gov-
ernment seeks to impose a prior restraint on anonymous speech.
However, these cases also establish that, even in the context of
prior restraints, the right to speak anonymously may yield to le-
gitimate interests.  In particular, the right to speak anonymously
offers little or no protection to those whose speech is actionable,
whether as fraud, defamation, or otherwise.  The Court remains
concerned that “[t]he right to remain anonymous may be abused
when it shields fraudulent conduct.”178  Even prior restraints,
when targeted against such wrongdoers, are likely to be upheld.
Likewise, although rare, the tort of trespass has been held to ap-
ply to protesters going onto private land to make a political
statement.179
Common-law claims against those whose speech constitutes
fraud, defamation, or another wrong are an important part of the
governmental mechanism for deterring such wrongdoing.  In-
deed, the Court has recognized that common-law defamation
claims provide an essential safeguard protecting the public
against the risk of abuse inherent in the right to speak anony-
mously.  Thus, the pursuit of common-law claims is wholly con-
sistent with existing anonymous speech jurisprudence.  If
anything, permitting such actions supports, rather than detracts
from, the right to speak anonymously, by permitting a form of
regulation of speech that is targeted directly at wrongdoing.
2. Journalistic Privilege Cases
The Supreme Court has also considered the application of the
First Amendment to efforts by government authorities to dis-
cover the identity of speakers after the fact.  While these cases
avoid the concerns about prior restraints that underlie the cases
178 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
179 E.g . Huffman & Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P.2d 101, 111 (Or. 1993) (en
banc) (upholding compensatory damages award against protesters who interfered
with logging operation, but scrutinizing punitive damages for speech basis).
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discussed in the preceding subsection, they are also difficult to
map directly into the John Doe context.
Arguably, the closest the Court has come to the situation
presented by a John Doe discovery request is its treatment of
journalistic privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes .180  Indeed, one com-
mentator has suggested that journalistic privilege is the proper
analogy for analyzing John Doe discovery.181  In Branzburg ,
journalists challenged grand jury subpoenas that sought to re-
quire them to identify anonymous sources under the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
press.182  The journalists argued that being forced to disclose
their sources would deter anonymous sources from speaking to
them and thereby burden the news-gathering process.  The Su-
preme Court rejected this argument and held that no First
Amendment privilege protects journalists from forced disclosure
to a grand jury of their confidential sources.  In explaining the
decision, Justice White for the Branzburg  majority expressly sup-
ported the decision on the grounds that, unlike prior restraints,
subsequent discovery of an anonymous source’s identity did not
unconstitutionally interfere with the practice of using anonymous
sources:
We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or
assembly to the country’s welfare. Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protec-
tion; without some protection for seeking out the news, free-
dom of the press could be eviscerated. But these cases involve
no intrusions upon speech or assembly, no prior restraint or
restriction on what the press may publish, and no express or
implied command that the press publish what it prefers to
withhold. No exaction or tax for the privilege of publishing,
and no penalty, civil or criminal, related to the content of pub-
lished material is at issue here. The use of confidential sources
by the press is not forbidden or restricted; reporters remain
free to seek news from any source by means within the law.
No attempt is made to require the press to publish its sources
of information or indiscriminately to disclose them on request.
The sole issue before us is the obligation of reporters to re-
180 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
181 Megan M. Sunkel, And the I(SP)s Have it . . . but How Does One Get It?
Examining the Lack of Standards for Ruling on Subpoenas Seeking to Reveal the
Identity of Anonymous Internet Users in Claims of Online Defamation , 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1189, 1213-18 (2003); Brief for Public Citizen, Electronic Frontier Foundation,
and Electronic Privacy Information Center as Amici Curiae at 14-15, Melvin v. Doe,
836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003) (Nos. 50 WAP 2002 and 51 WAP 2002).
182 408 U.S. at 679-81.
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spond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to an-
swer questions relevant to an investigation into the
commission of crime.183
On its face, Branzburg  would seem to dispose of John Doe
claims to First Amendment protection.  While the governmental
interest in disclosure of crimes to a grand jury is arguably greater
than a plaintiff’s interest in the disclosure of relevant information
in a civil proceeding, the Court’s reasoning, at least, is not so
limited.  For example, the Court cites with approval the Second
Circuit’s 1958 decision in Garland v. Torre (authored by later
Justice Stewart),184 which rejected the assertion made by “a news
gatherer . . . for the first time that the First Amendment ex-
empted confidential information from public disclosure pursuant
to a subpoena issued in a civil suit.”185  Likewise, Branzburg  in-
vokes the “longstanding principle that ‘the public . . . has a right
to every man’s evidence,’” a principle which it explained is “viv-
idly illustrated” by Jeremy Bentham’s suggestion that if they
were witnesses, the Prince of Wales, Archbishop of Canterbury,
and Lord High Chancellor could be compelled to testify in a civil
dispute over “halfpennyworth of apples.”186
Moreover, the Branzburg  majority makes a number of conclu-
sions which are relevant, at least by analogy, to John Doe discov-
ery requests.  Most fundamentally, the Court observes that the
privilege claimed is not the source’s, but the reporter’s.187  While
the source may have an “understandable” preference for ano-
nymity, that desire for anonymity does not rise to the level of an
evidentiary privilege, far less a constitutional preference.188  By
analogy, an ISP maintaining a message board (e.g., Yahoo!)
might assert some kind of privilege, that the John Doe poster him
or herself would not.189  Moreover, the majority makes a clear
183 Id.  at 681-82.
184 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied , 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
185 408 U.S. at 685-86.
186 Id . at 688 & n.26.
187 Id . at 695.
188 See id . at 691, 695-96.
189 Arguably, John Doe is not analogous to the anonymous source because, in
most cases, the anonymous source would be called upon to testify to information of
which he was aware prior to the communication with the reporter, while in the John
Doe case it is the communication with the ISP itself (the posting along with identify-
ing information supplied to the ISP) that is the subject of the discovery.  However,
this distinction will not always hold.  For example, if an anonymous source had
learned of relevant information through a communication protected by a recognized
privilege (e.g., if the target of the grand jury had confessed to her spouse), it is
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 40 12-APR-05 10:43
834 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
distinction between actual restraints on what may be published,
as opposed to the merely secondary effect of reducing what is
published by deterring sources from speaking to reporters.190
While the Court does not deny that such deterrence might occur
or hold that it is completely lacking in constitutional importance,
the Court was highly skeptical of the unproven claim of deter-
rence, as well as viewing indirect deterrence as inherently less
worrisome than direct restraints.191
Finally, and of particular relevance to John Doe discovery, the
Branzburg  majority centrally relies on the reasoning that requir-
ing judges to make outcome-determinative privilege decisions
places an untenable burden on the judicial role.  In particular,
the Court explains that forcing judges to make such a case-by-
case determination would have the undesirable effect of making
courts “inextricably involved in distinguishing between the value
of enforcing different criminal laws”:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and diffi-
cult journey to such an uncertain destination.  The administra-
tion of a constitutional newsman’s privilege would present
practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.  Sooner or
later, it would be necessary to define those categories of news-
men who qualified for the privilege, a questionable
procedure . . . .
In each instance where a reporter is subpoenaed to testify, the
courts would also be embroiled in preliminary factual and le-
gal determinations with respect to whether the proper predi-
cate had been laid for the reporter’s appearance: Is there
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed?  Is it
likely that the reporter has useful information gained in confi-
dence?  Could the grand jury obtain the information else-
where? Is the official interest sufficient to outweigh the
claimed privilege?
Thus, in the end, by considering whether enforcement of a
particular law served a ‘compelling’ governmental interest, the
courts would be inextricably involved in distinguishing be-
tween the value of enforcing different criminal laws.  By re-
quiring testimony from a reporter in investigations involving
some crimes but not in others, they would be making a value
judgment that a legislature had declined to make, since in each
case the criminal law involved would represent a considered
possible that the grand jury would seek to inquire of the source about his communi-
cation with the reporter, as that communication may have waived (or be outside of)
the prior privilege.
190 See  408 U.S. at 691-93.
191 See id . at 693-94.
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legislative judgment, not constitutionally suspect, of what con-
duct is liable to criminal prosecution. The task of judges, like
other officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the
law but to uphold it in accordance with their oaths.192
Branzburg  is complicated, however, by the fact that it was de-
cided by a 5-4 vote, with one of the majority, Justice Powell, filing
a separate concurrence.  In that concurrence, Justice Powell
made clear that some form of First Amendment “privilege” does
exist to protect journalists from having to disclose confidential
sources.193  Such a privilege would protect disclosure in cases of
“harassment of newsmen,” when “the grand jury investigation is
not being conducted in good faith,” the journalist “is called upon
to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relation-
ship to the subject of the investigation,” or if there is no “legiti-
mate need of law enforcement.”194  Since Powell was the decisive
fifth vote, Branzburg  has been interpreted as rejecting an abso-
lute privilege for confidential journalistic sources but recognizing
a qualified privilege.195
Whether because of Justice Powell’s concurrence or a concern
for the significant role of confidential sources in maintaining a
vibrant press, courts following Branzburg ’s strongly-worded re-
jection of journalistic privilege have not freely ordered discovery
of journalists’ confidential sources in civil discovery.196  Part of
the reason for this reluctance may be that many civil cases impli-
cate state, rather than federal, law of journalistic privilege, mean-
ing that a privilege may apply under state law even without
consideration of a possible federal qualified privilege.197  Fur-
ther, even when federal law applies, courts have held that the
important public concerns involved in a criminal investigation
192 Id . at 703-06 (citations and footnotes omitted).
193 Id . at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
194 Id.  at 709-10.
195 E.g. , Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784-85 (2d Cir. 1972); see also  Carey v.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 635-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934, 938 n.3 (Cal. 1990); In re
Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40, 42 (Idaho 1985); State v. Siel, 444 A.2d 499, 502-
03 (N.H. 1982). But see In re  Decker, 471 S.E.2d 462, 465 (S.C. 1995) (holding that
Branzburg  rejected both absolute and qualified privileges, while acknowledging that
it recognized protection from disclosure under “certain limited circumstances” in-
volving bad faith and harassment).
196 E.g., Baker , 470 F.2d at 783; Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co.,
633 F.2d 583, 595-99 (1st Cir. 1980).
197 E.g. , Delaney , 789 P.2d at 939-45.
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are not equally implicated by civil discovery.198  As a result,
courts considering discovery requests seeking journalists’ confi-
dential sources generally engage in a case-by-case inquiry, focus-
ing on the centrality of the discovery of the source’s identity to
the claim.  When the source’s identity is central and cannot be
discovered by other means, discovery has generally been granted;
where the information is available from sources other than the
journalist and its relevance is tangential, discovery has generally
been denied.199
Finally, in interpreting these post-Branzburg cases, it is also
necessary to recall that they are decided in the context of the
great deference many courts give to the journalists.  In particular,
many courts apply a journalistic privilege in cases not involving
any confidential information, although a weaker privilege applies
than in instances involving confidential information.200  This priv-
ilege derives from the concern that, if discovery of journalists
were freely allowed, it would be regularly sought and would
thereby burden the newsgathering and reporting process, thereby
interfering with the public good of a vigorous free press.201  Since
there is no comparable reason to give similar deference to ISPs,
the overall case for applying a privilege in that context will be
weaker.  Indeed, courts have declined to recognize any privilege
when confidential information is gathered and maintained for
non-journalistic purposes.202
B. Application of Right of Anonymous Speech to John
Doe Cases
While neither the prior restraint cases nor the anonymous
198 E.g. , Baker , 470 F.2d at 784-85; see also Carey , 492 F.2d at 635-36.
199 E.g. , Baker , 470 F.2d at 783-84 (denying discovery where there were “other
available sources of information . . . which appellants had not exhausted” and where
appellants failed to demonstrate that the source’s identity was “necessary, much less
critical,” to the claim); Bruno & Stillman , 633 F.2d at 595-99; Carey , 492 F.2d at 636;
cf.  Britt v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 775-76 (Cal. 1975) (refusing under First
Amendment to require disclosure in litigation of plaintiffs’ associational activities
denied under First Amendment where those activities “appear quite unrelated to
the matters placed at issue by plaintiffs’ complaints”; stating that discovery may be
permitted where information is “essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit”).
200 E.g. , Gonzales v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 194 F.3d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1999); see gener-
ally  McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532-33 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing cases demon-
strating division of authority over whether to extend journalistic privilege to
nonconfidential sources).
201 See Gonzales , 194 F.3d at 34-35; McKevitt , 339 F.3d at 532-33.
202 E.g. , von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1987).
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source cases map directly to anonymous Internet speech, to-
gether they do suggest a common-sense approach that would bal-
ance the competing interests involved.  In particular, neither set
of cases establishes that the First Amendment requires a limita-
tion on discovery in the John Doe context.  However, they do
reflect a sufficient concern for the First Amendment-type inter-
ests involved that it is reasonable for courts to consider those
interests.  Taken together, these conclusions suggest that courts
should, within existing frameworks, seek to consider defendants’
arguments that their anonymity should not lightly be disturbed.
However, absent a First Amendment mandate to go beyond ex-
isting rules, courts should not do so without some clear evidence
indicating that the existing rules are themselves somehow lack-
ing.  As set forth in Part IV, existing rules are sufficient to pro-
tect the legitimate interests that defendants may have.
First, while the Talley  line of cases establishes that the First
Amendment can in some circumstances protect a speaker’s ano-
nymity, those cases are limited by the fact that they arise in the
special, and highly disfavored, context of prior restraints.  To the
extent they touch upon the issue at all, the cases suggest that
subsequent disclosure is entitled to far less protection, and none
if wrongdoing by the speaker is involved.  They are relevant to
John Doe discovery applications because it is at least plausible
that the threat of discovery will deter some speech, either by the
speaker or others.  For example, after Dendrite posted notice of
its lawsuit, the defendants greatly reduced their posting activity
and in fact overall posting on the board declined.203  The concern
here, of course, is not that defamatory or fraudulent speech
might be deterred, but that the risk of disclosure might also chill
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.  For example,
an employee might be afraid to post a comment unfavorable to
his employer for fear that the employer will allege it to be defam-
atory and seek to learn his identity to terminate him.
There is no way to judge precisely how large such a chilling
effect might be from discovery in a particular John Doe action
(or from John Doe actions in the aggregate), but the Supreme
Court has made clear that some risk of deterrence is acceptable if
203 While an anonymous poster might change names, that would not necessarily
solve the problem because his audience may be dependent on the pseudonymous
identity.  Atrios could create another blog under another name, but absent his estab-
lished readership it would be unlikely, at least in the short run, to draw a similar
audience.
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closely tied to a legitimate governmental interest.  So, for exam-
ple, in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc. ,
the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to require
petition circulators to wear identity badges, and observed that
the state’s interest in apprehending wrongdoers was protected by
the constitutional requirement that the filed petition contain the
circulator’s name and address.204  This affidavit is “available to
law enforcers” and, indeed, “a public record,” but is not uncon-
stitutional because it “does not expose the circulator to the risk
of ‘heat of the moment’ harassment.”205  In the context of John
Doe discovery, in contrast, the plaintiff is not seeking a blanket
prohibition against anonymous speech, but rather seeks to serve
the complaint upon individuals as to whom it has filed a non-
dismissable claim.206  The requirement of filing a non-dismissable
complaint is a far greater impediment to “heat of the moment”
(or any) harassment than simply having to check public records,
as permitted by Buckley .207  So, for example, if individuals were
sponsoring a petition to which a corporation was opposed, it
would not necessarily be unconstitutional to discover their identi-
ties through mandatory public filings—even though (unlike John
Doe defendants) there may be no allegation that they had com-
mitted any tort, even though (unlike many John Doe defendants)
core political speech was involved, and even though (unlike
many John Doe defendants) the speakers might be employees
subject to retribution.
Journalistic privilege cases offer little more to the John Doe
defendant.  These cases are arguably a closer match to the
problems raised by John Doe discovery requests than the Talley
line of prior restraint cases, because anonymous Internet posters
have an interest in continuing anonymity, just as confidential
sources have an interest in remaining confidential.  However,
whatever privilege does exist is the privilege of the journalist, not
the source, and arises from the special role of a free press in our
society.  No similar rationale applies to protect ISPs from having
to disclose the identity of anonymous posters, and the posters,
unlike anonymous sources, cannot thereby benefit indirectly.208
204 525 U.S. 182, 198-99 (1999).
205 Id .
206 See infra  notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
207 See  525 U.S. at 198-99.
208 To be sure, it may affect ISPs’ business to release customer information.  Pre-
sumably, this is the reason that some ISPs have expended resources resisting sub-
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To the extent generalization is possible, the case for disclosure is
stronger in the context of Internet speakers, at least when they
are defendants, because the action arises out of their alleged
wrongdoing.  In contrast, journalists’ anonymous sources may
just as likely be innocent whistleblowers as willing participants in
wrongdoing.  Moreover, Branzburg ’s skepticism concerning forc-
ing judges to make case-by-case weighings of the importance of a
particular prosecution have particular resonance in this area, be-
cause the Dendrite  test requires judges to undertake a similar
unguided analysis as to the importance of particular claims.
Further, even if Internet posters could claim the benefit of a
First Amendment privilege protecting journalists’ confidential
sources, the very existence of such a privilege remains in doubt.
The Branzburg  majority declined to find a privilege, and ex-
pressed an unmistakable preference for giving evidence over pre-
serving anonymity.  Even the Branzburg  concurrence, while
using the word “privilege,” spoke of limiting disclosure in the ex-
treme cases of harassment, irrelevant evidence, and the like.209
Similarly, subsequent lower court decisions denying discovery,
whether under the name of “qualified privilege” or otherwise,
have done so in such cases or, at a minimum, where the re-
quested discovery was not necessary to the case, because it was
irrelevant, the case was untenable, the information could be ob-
tained by other means, or otherwise.210  It is beyond doubt that
courts have the power to reject discovery demands in such cir-
cumstances, without need of a privilege.  Thus, these cases do lit-
tle more than recognize that courts maintain the power to control
discovery, and that a speaker’s anonymity, at least in the context
of confidential sources, is an interest warranting protection
where appropriate in the context of the individual litigation.
Beyond the individual doctrines, the context involved in John
Doe discovery requests will often complicate the application of
any First Amendment protection that a court should conclude
poenas. See , e.g. , Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am v. Verizon Internet Servs. Inc., 351
F.3d 1229, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  However, unlike the burden on the free press of
revealing confidential sources, that burden is not one that goes to the core of the
expressive function of the business.  Rather, the harm of risking loss of customers
from revealing customer information could equally be imposed on other businesses
entrusted with confidential information whose business does not depend on public
discourse (e.g., banks, hospitals, accountants, or lawyers).
209 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
210 See supra  note 195.
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applies, because (unless there is no First Amendment protection)
the identity of the speaker often matters in determining the
scope of protection afforded.  Thus, the extent of First Amend-
ment protection for the defendant’s identity cannot be deter-
mined until the identity has already been disclosed.  For example,
a corporate speaker may have lesser protection of its anonymity
than an individual.211  In cases where “actual malice” is an ele-
ment to be proved by the plaintiff, the defendant’s identity may
be highly relevant to motive and, thus, to whether malice is es-
tablished.  For example, the fact (as in the Callaway Golf situa-
tion described above) that defendant was the president of the
victim’s competitor would be highly probative of a guilty state of
mind.  In some cases, a common-law privilege against defamation
liability (e.g., the common-interest privilege) may apply, but the
availability of the privilege may depend on whether the defen-
dant is a member of a group entitled to such a privilege.  While
this problem could theoretically be addressed by in camera  re-
view of the documents to be produced, determining whether an
individual is acting within the scope of his employment and thus
treated as a corporate speaker, may be impracticable without
genuine discovery.  For example, in the Callaway Golf situation,
information showing that the anonymous poster was “Steven
Cade” would not have revealed that he was acting as president of
one of Callaway’s competitors, a fact which would have required
further investigation of the kind that courts are poorly equipped
to undertake.212
In particular, the cases make clear that the First Amendment
interest in anonymity is significant, and should be taken seri-
ously, but that it will yield when a significant need relating to a
properly justiciable controversy is presented.  As applied, this
suggests that courts should actively involve themselves in the res-
olution of John Doe discovery applications, but should be hesi-
tant to imply new procedural rules without clear proof that
existing rules are inadequate.213
211 See  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 353-54 (1995).
212 See  Cataldo & Killough, supra  note 117, at 34.  When the universe of suspects
is reasonably limited, a plaintiff could provide a judge with a list of suspects, such as
employees.  This solution, however, will not work in all situations.
213 See infra  Part IV (dicussing the adequacy of existing rules).
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IV
THE ADEQUACY OF EXISTING PROCEDURAL RULES
Though couched in the rhetoric of the Internet, First Amend-
ment, and privacy, John Doe discovery requests actually call for
the application of relatively mundane rules of civil procedure.
While the applicable rules vary from state to state, most states
routinely permit the filing of complaints against fictitious name
defendants (i.e., John Does) and allow plaintiffs to engage in dis-
covery to identify such defendants by name.214  Likewise, while
the federal rules do not expressly authorize the use of fictitious-
named parties, in practice, “John Doe parties have become an
essential part of federal civil practice.”215
Cases asserting claims against defendants whose identity is un-
known need not arise in the context of the Internet or even in
areas involving actionable speech or claims of First Amendment
protection.  For example, such suits are often used to identify a
manufacturer of a defective product component,216 or to identify
government officials for civil rights violations.217  In the latter
context, the First Circuit described the right to identify defend-
ants through discovery as a “principle of fairness [that] recog-
nizes that a plaintiff in the heat of a confrontation with police
may not know or have the opportunity to learn the identity of the
214 See, e.g. , Molina v. Panco Const., Inc., 49 P.3d 570, 573-74 (Mont. 2002); Doe
v. Miss. Blood Serv., Inc., 704 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss. 1997); Bernson v. Browning-
Ferris Indus., 7 Cal. 4th 926, 932-33 (1994); Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 503 A.2d 296, 301-
02 (N.J. 1986).
215 Rice, supra  note 28, at 884; see also id.  at 886 (“Although the pseudonymous
plaintiff is perhaps the more well known use of John Doe, it is John Doe as the
unknown defendant who more frequently helps plaintiffs.”).
216 See, e.g. , Bogseth v. Emanuel, 633 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (permitting
discovery for plaintiff to identify unnamed defendant responsible for alleged medi-
cal malpractice); Viviano , 503 A.2d at 298-99, 301-02 (N.J. 1986) (approving proce-
dure whereby plaintiff discovered identity of John Doe corporation as a result of
extensive court-authorized depositions, document production, and interrogatories);
Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 299 A.2d 394, 395 (N.J. 1973) (approv-
ing procedure whereby identity of John Doe corporation discovered during deposi-
tions);  Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe, 331 N.E.2d 502, 507 (N.Y. 1975)
(permitting discovery for plaintiff to identify alleged anonymous fraud-doers). But
see  Conn. Res. Recovery Auth. v. Refuse Gardens, Inc., No. 364240, 1992 WL
67373, *1-2 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 25, 1992) (holding that Connecticut does not
permit joining of unnamed defendants).
217 See, e.g. , Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 390 n.2 (1971); Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 n.16 (1st Cir.
2002).
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alleged wrongdoer.”218
Once a complaint has been filed against a John Doe, the plain-
tiff is permitted to use the various—and ordinary—discovery de-
vices available to pursue his case in order to identify and locate
the John Doe defendant.  Indeed, prior to the present wave of
Internet cases, courts have ordered disclosure of information
about the identities of fictitious name defendants, even when
there were claims of alleged privilege.219  Courts and commenta-
tors that have called for a higher level of protection for the iden-
tity of defendants accused of anonymous misconduct on the
Internet therefore implicitly argue that existing rules are not suf-
ficient to the task.  This section examines those rules and con-
cludes that, for the most part, the existing rules are adequate to
protect John Doe defendants and to balance appropriately the
relevant interests.
Claims against John Doe defendants are usually commenced in
state court because lack of knowledge of John Doe’s identity will
prevent plaintiff from alleging diversity jurisdiction,220 although a
claim could be brought in federal court if there is another basis
for federal jurisdiction, such as a federal claim under 28 U.S.C.
section 1983.  Some states provide express procedures for ob-
taining discovery of unidentified defendants,221 but in most states
218 Wilson , 294 F.3d at 7 n.16.
219 See, e.g. , Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A ., 331 N.E.2d at 507 (affirming order
requiring attorney to identify client defendant in fraud conspiracy case); Dry Branch
Kaolin Co. v. Doe, 622 A.2d 1320, 1323-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (order-
ing John Doe’s attorney to disclose the name of John Doe defendant-client despite
attorney-client privilege); Brien v. Lomazow, 547 A.2d 318, 327-28 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988) (permitting plaintiff-doctor to seek to identify unknown defendant
who previously filed false claim of misconduct, despite informant privilege, by com-
pelling disclosure from state agency that originally received the defendant’s claim).
220 Federal courts have frequently taken an ad hoc approach to whether the pres-
ence of a John Doe defendant defeats diversity jurisdiction that is otherwise proper.
See  14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3642
(3d ed. 1998).  However, except in the unusual case where a defendant’s anonymous
conduct makes it possible to plead his domicile consistent with FEDERAL RULE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, a federal court is unlikely to exercise jurisdiction when the
only defendants are unidentified.
221 E.g. , CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 2001) (“When the plaintiff is ignorant
of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in the complaint . . . and when his
true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended accord-
ingly.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3102(c) (permitting discovery by court order “to aid in
bringing an action”). R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-20 (2004) states that:
Whenever the name of any defendant or respondent is not known to the
plaintiff, the summons and other process may issue against him or her by a
fictitious name, or by such description as the plaintiff or complainant may
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it is the responsibility of the plaintiff’s lawyer to navigate through
rules that were usually not designed with such cases in mind.  As
Carol Rice observed in discussing John Doe procedures under
the federal rules, “each plaintiff must guess about the proper
procedures for filing a Doe complaint.”222  While this uncertainty
burdens plaintiffs, it also burdens defendants, because as a prac-
tical matter lawyers often avoid the arcane exercise of determin-
ing the proper procedure and, instead, choose “short cuts” that
can deprive defendants of their opportunity to be heard.223
This section provides a brief roadmap of the procedural steps
necessary to obtain discovery of the identity of an unnamed de-
fendant.  It is my hope that this outline will provide both a frame-
work for answering the jurisprudential issues raised by this
Article and a guide for practitioners and judges involved in these
matters.224  The analysis addresses procedures generally, rather
than focusing on the procedure of a particular state, although it
also highlights points where a particular state’s practice may
vary.  On the whole, the relevant procedural rules are substan-
tially similar from state to state, for the very reason that these
motions can be resolved using basic procedural rules.
select; and if duly served, it shall not be abated for that cause, but may be
amended with or without terms as the court may order.
222 Rice, supra  note 29, at 918.  Professor Rice’s observation is confirmed by the R
author’s personal experience, which includes multiple practitioners whom the author
did not know calling for advice concerning the proper procedure in this sort of case.
See also supra  note 215.
223 These short cuts include simply using an attorney-issued subpoena prior to
service of process on any defendant, which is generally improper, or serving a defen-
dant against whom the plaintiff has no bona fide claim, such as an Internet service
provider, in order to allow issuance of a subpoena signed by an attorney.  In either
case, the defendant’s only protection from disclosure is the subpoena recipient’s de-
cision whether to inform him or her of the subpoena and to withhold disclosure
pending judicial decision.
224 In my experience practicing in this area and speaking to practitioners involved
in similar cases, these John Doe proceedings have created a good deal of confusion
among judges and practitioners.  For example, plaintiffs’ attorneys are often con-
fused about the fact that attorney-issued subpoenas, usually the preferred type of
subpoena in most states, may not be appropriate for the identification of an un-
known defendant, or they may believe it is necessary to join an ISP as a defendant,
when joinder may not even be appropriate due to the ISP’s immunity under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
Defendants’ attorneys have expressed confusion about whether they are subject to
the court’s general jurisdiction as a result of being served with a discovery motion.
In Dendrite , the court, before signing the initial order to show cause initiating the
discovery motion, requested clarification as to its procedural authority for ordering
such discovery.
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A. Drafting a Complaint
First, plaintiff must commence an action, as discovery is gener-
ally unavailable except when an action is pending.  Many states
expressly permit actions against parties under fictitious names
where the defendants’ true names are unknown despite diligent
efforts.225  Such states generally require that, prior to judgment,
the complaint be amended to state the defendants’ true names,226
thus at least implicitly recognizing the possibility of discovery be-
ing conducted concerning the identity of defendants.
Other states—notably those following the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—do not expressly authorize the joining of de-
fendants under ficticious names.227  Since the federal rules (and
state codes based upon them) do not prohibit John Doe
claims,228 courts in states without an express fictitious parties
provision may properly accept pleadings alleging fictitious-
named defendants, and many have done so.229
A few courts have denied plaintiffs the option of suing ficti-
tious-named parties absent an express provision permitting such
pleadings.230  However, such rulings are rare and, to put it
bluntly, “wrong.”231  A blanket rule prohibiting a plaintiff from
suing a fictitious-named defendant, even assuming the plaintiff
has a valid claim against the defendant and has made diligent
efforts to identify the defendant, would serve only to defeat valid
claims with no countervailing benefit.  The results of such a blan-
ket rule would be particularly unjustifiable because they would
equally exclude claims where it was defendant’s own wrong that
caused plaintiff not to know whom to sue.  In the absence of an
express prohibition on suing fictitious-named defendants, there-
fore, prohibiting such claims would violate the court’s role (ex-
pressly incorporated in most procedural codes) in facilitating the
just resolution of disputes.232  In any case, in those jurisdictions
that flatly prohibit fictitious name practice, the question posed by
225 E.g. , CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 2004); N.J. R. CT. 4:26-4.
226 E.g. , CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474; N.J. R. CT. 4:26-4.
227 See Rice, supra  note 28, at 914.
228 See id . at 914-17.
229 E.g. , Hebert v. Honest Bingo, 18 P.3d 43, 45, 48-49 (Alaska 2001) (holding that
amended complaint may relate back to time of original complaint against “John
Doe”); Kramer v. Installations Unlimited, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ohio Ct. App.
2002) (recognizing permissibility of naming “John Does”).
230 E.g. , Roe v. New York, 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
231 Rice, supra  note 28, at 914.
232 E.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 1; N.J. R. CT. 1:1-2; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 104.
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this Article—whether to impose different standards for the dis-
covery of the identity of defendants acting anonymously on the
Internet than for the discovery of other matters—will not arise,
as the case simply will not proceed.
While suing fictitious-named defendants is possible in most ju-
risdictions, the plaintiff’s task is made easier if the complaint can
name a non-fictitious defendant.  The plaintiff can then either
add the fictitious-named defendant as an additional defendant,
or simply amend the complaint to add the John Doe’s true name
after discovery.  In either case, the plaintiff avoids possible argu-
ments that the action may not be filed.  Moreover, as discussed
below, it is much easier for the plaintiff to obtain discovery after
at least one defendant has been properly served.  However, it is
not systematically possible to name “real” defendants.  The obvi-
ous defendant that would be available in most cases, the Internet
service provider on which the challenged message is posted, will
generally be immune from suit under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”).233  While plaintiffs may nonetheless
be tempted to sue ISPs to gain these practical advantages, doing
so in light of DCMA immunity would raise substantial issues
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its
state analogues.234
From time to time, there may be another defendant who can
be named, either because his actions were not anonymous or be-
cause the plaintiff has identified him from sources other than dis-
covery.  Plaintiff may only join such a defendant, however, if
there is an adequate connection between the claims against the
named and unnamed defendants.  While the precise standard
varies by jurisdiction, ordinarily the plaintiff will have to estab-
lish that its claims are “in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.”235  This standard would clearly be satisfied in
the rare case where a named and an unnamed defendant were
known to have conspired in a single message or set of messages.
In the more ordinary case, however, where defendants are simply
two posters on the same message board, it will be a closer call as
233 See supra  notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
234 E.g. , N.J. R. CT. 1:4-8.
235 FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a); see also, e.g. , N.J. R. CT. 4:29-1(a); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
1002(b).
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to whether this standard is met.  As a practical matter, however,
in most cases plaintiff will be able to join defendants in good
faith, and a motion for misjoinder is an unlikely vehicle for chal-
lenging the discovery request.
B. Submitting an Order to Show Cause
While most procedural codes permit attorneys to issue subpoe-
nas without prior court approval,236 this practice is not usually
available to identify fictitious-named defendants.  Rather, the
plaintiff must seek court approval to obtain the defendant’s iden-
tity.  The need for court approval derives from the prohibition in
most states against the plaintiff seeking discovery without court
approval prior to service of the answer (and, by extension, ser-
vice of the complaint).  For example, New Jersey expressly au-
thorizes discovery to proceed at any time “after commencement
of the action,”237 but also requires “[l]eave of court, granted with
or without notice, . . . if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition
prior to the expiration of thirty-five days after service of the sum-
mons and complaint.”238  Under the federal rules (and the rules
of states adopting those rules),239 the plaintiff must obtain court
approval to take discovery prior to the initial party conference
concerning discovery,240 which obviously cannot occur if the de-
fendant has not been identified.
In most states, the appropriate procedure for obtaining per-
mission to serve pre-answer discovery demands (whether in a
John Doe action or in any other type of case) is an order to show
cause.  The plaintiff cannot make an ordinary motion seeking the
discovery because a motion must be served upon opposing par-
ties, which is impossible because the plaintiff does not know the
identity of those parties.241  An order to show cause solves this
problem because the order can contain directions as to how the
order itself and supporting papers must be served.  For example,
when the claims arise out of defendant’s posting on an Internet
236 E.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3); N.J. R. CT. 1:9-1; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 2302(a).
237 I.e ., after filing of the complaint.
238 N.J. R. CT. 4:2-2.
239 N.J. R. CT. 4:14-1.  These timing provisions apply equally to subpoenas requir-
ing production of documents. See N.J. R. CT. 4:14-1, 4:14-7(a) (providing that at-
tendance at deposition may be compelled by subpoena, which may also require
production of documents).
240 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d).
241 E.g. , N.J. R. CT. 1:5-1(a), 1:6-2(a); N.Y. C.P.L.R. §§ 2103(e), 2211.
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bulletin board, the court may direct the order to be served by
posting it on the same bulletin board.242  More generally, courts
in most states have broad authority to do justice that permits
them to tailor an order to the needs of an individual situation.243
While local practice varies as to how closely orders to show
cause are scrutinized by judges, the procedure permits the court
to impose safeguards protecting the legitimate interests of both
defendants and plaintiffs.  First, the plaintiff must submit an affi-
davit that supports both the need for the discovery and the need
for the extraordinary procedure of an order to show cause.
While the precise contents of such an affidavit may vary, likely
components are an affidavit summarizing the allegations (or even
verifying the complaint), demonstrating the necessity of the dis-
covery, and demonstrating the necessity of proceeding by order
to show cause.  The core aspects of such a showing will normally
include establishing that the plaintiff has a genuine claim against
the defendant and that the plaintiff cannot, despite due diligence,
identify the defendant.  Second, the judge performs an important
screening function by reviewing the allegations for at least the
minimal threshold to justify permitting the motion to proceed by
order to show cause.  Third, the judge has the discretion in the
order to show cause to impose additional requirements that facil-
itate a fair resolution of the issue.  Typically, the judge will estab-
lish a briefing and hearing schedule to permit the defendants to
be heard.  The judge’s order can also include other provisions
protecting both plaintiffs and defendants and assuring an orderly
resolution of the issue.  For example, the order may require that
plaintiffs notify defendants of the motion by the most effective
method—such as by posting the order to show cause on the mes-
sage board where the offending comments were posted.244  (In
242 This procedure was followed in Dendrite , where the plaintiff’s order to show
cause was posted.  Posting of Michael S. Vogel, to Yahoo! Message Board:  DRTE
(June 23, 2000) (on file with author).
243 For example, NEW JERSEY COURT RULE 1:1-2 provides in relevant part, “Un-
less otherwise stated, any rule may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in
which the action is pending if adherence to it would result in an injustice.”  While
few other states permit rules to be “dispensed with,” most do permit courts wide
leeway in the interpretation of rules (subject, of course, to appellate review). E.g. ,
FED. R. CIV. P. 1; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 104.
244 The trial judge in Dendrite  is the first judge known to have required such a
posting.  Whether such a notice is likely to come to the defendant’s attention may
depend on the circumstances, such as the total volume of posts on the board, how
frequently defendant posts, and whether those posts indicate that he or she reads
other messages.  In addition, the court could order the ISP to produce documenta-
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some circumstances, disclosure to the defendant may also be
mandatory under statutory law.)245  The court may require that
the notice be written in specific language and be effective in con-
veying to lay defendants a summary of key procedural rights—
such as advising in simple language that the court will consider
informal objections if the defendants choose not to retain coun-
sel.246  To protect plaintiffs, it may direct that defendants or third
parties not destroy relevant evidence.
C. Hearing on the Order to Show Cause
If the order is signed, a briefing schedule will be set and a hear-
ing will likely be scheduled.  The order can and should require
that, where feasible, John Doe receive notice and have an oppor-
tunity to interpose objections to the discovery demand.  It is also
possible that the custodian of the records may interpose an ob-
jection.  For example, an Internet service provider may choose to
impose an objection to the belief that protecting a customer’s pri-
vacy is good for public relations or simply because it believes
there is a problem with the discovery demand. As described in
Part I.C. above, there is evidence that some ISPs are doing pre-
cisely that.247
Without reliance on any new or special rules to govern this
kind of discovery request, ordinary rules of procedure provide a
number of possible avenues for a defendant to oppose the dis-
covery demand.
First, the defendant may oppose the discovery on the grounds
that the complaint should be dismissed.  Courts have consistently
permitted defendants to assert such opposition through counsel
without revealing their identities.248  Technically, this opposition
need not be asserted in a formal motion to dismiss, because the
complaint has not yet been served.  However, establishing that a
complaint will not survive a motion to dismiss should defeat dis-
tion as to whether the defendant accessed the posting, although this would depend
on the ISP’s collecting such information and the defendant not taking action, such as
using a different Internet protocol address, to avoid detection.
245 E.g. , 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2000).
246 Cf. , e.g. , Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974)
(holding a summons constitutionally defective when it failed to advise defendant
adequately of procedural rights).
247 See supra  notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
248 E.g. , La Societe Metro Cash & Carry France v. Time Warner Cable, 36 Conn.
L. Rptr. 170 (Super. Ct. 2003); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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covery because the defendant’s identity would then not be rele-
vant to any issue presented in the case.  While notice pleading
does permit claims to be pled even when they are not ultimately
viable, this kind of motion should be sufficient to prevent many
improper claims.  Many states require pleading of the particular-
ized words complained of in defamation claims,249 which are
probably both the most common claims brought against John
Does and the most likely to be brought in error or for improper
reasons.  Court review of those particularized pleadings should
serve as an important check on improper claims.
Other types of claims—such as copyright violations or
breaches of contract—may not formally require particularized
pleading, but are still governed by rules requiring that a plaintiff
have a reasonable (or good faith) basis for its pleadings.250
Moreover, even when particularized pleading of a plaintiff’s
claim is not mandated by blanket rule, particularized allegations
can usually be required on a case-by-case basis where appropri-
ate, either by a demand for a bill of particulars, where permit-
ted,251 or by a court-ordered particularized reply.252
Second, even when a plaintiff has superficially pled an actiona-
ble claim against the defendant, the defendant may oppose the
discovery application by establishing that he or she is entitled to
summary judgment.  Again, the basis for denial of discovery
would then be that the defendant’s identity is not relevant to any
issue in the action.  Significantly, such an opposition does not re-
quire the defendant to come forward with affirmative evidence
establishing his right to summary judgment, although it is possi-
ble that the defendant will submit such evidence.  Rather, sum-
mary judgment procedure permits the party that does not bear
the burden of proof to shift the burden of production of evidence
to the party bearing the burden of proof by demonstrating the
absence of record evidence supporting the claim.253  In some
cases, of course, the information necessary to oppose the motion
will require discovery of the defendant’s identity.  For example,
249 E.g. , N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3016(a), available at  http://assembly.state.ny.us/
leg?cl=16&a=27.
250 E.g. , FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b); N.J. R. CT. 1:4-8(a).
251 E.g. , N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3041.
252 In federal court, this may be accomplished by requiring a particularized reply
to a defendant’s answer. See, e.g. , Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430-34 (5th Cir.
1995).
253 E.g. , Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
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in cases involving postings concerning public companies, evi-
dence that the defendant is an owner or employee of a competi-
tor may be relevant to issues such as malice or to damages.
Likewise, in cases involving possible stock manipulation, evi-
dence of defendant’s trading records (which will only be discov-
erable after the defendant is identified) will be necessary to
prove plaintiff’s claim.  In such cases, a motion for summary
judgment would not succeed, and an effort to avoid discovery
under such a standard would fail.
Testing an application for discovery under such a “defensive”
summary judgment standard makes a great deal of sense.  It
would permit discovery of a defendant’s identity when the plain-
tiff had evidence supporting all elements of its claim, or at least
all elements which should be in the plaintiff’s, rather than the
defendant’s, possession.  This standard would, therefore, provide
an effective check that would tend to limit discovery to those
cases where the plaintiff had a bona fide claim.  Discovery would
be precluded either when the plaintiff lacked evidence that it
should have had to commence the action, or when the defendant
can affirmatively establish that the plaintiff cannot establish its
claim.
A difficult issue may arise in cases where the evidence in ques-
tion is not simply factual evidence that should be in the plaintiff’s
custody, but is the subject of expert testimony.  The practical
problem presented by such a situation is that even if such expert
testimony does not depend on information within the defen-
dant’s custody (e.g., trading patterns), the expert testimony may
be very expensive to obtain.  While that is evidence that a plain-
tiff would have to obtain if it proceeds to trial, a plaintiff is not
ordinarily required to produce such evidence at the outset of a
litigation.  More important, a plaintiff has a strong interest in
knowing whether the defendant has the financial means to satisfy
a judgment before investing the resources in gathering such evi-
dence.  As one court has observed, “plaintiff needs to know the
identity of the Doe defendants prior to incurring the expenses
and other burdens of trial, because it is questionable whether
plaintiff would wish to proceed with a trial if . . . it is unlikely that
any judgment that she obtained would be satisfied.”254  In the
context of a summary judgment motion made prior to the close
254 Melvin v. Doe, Pa. D. & C.4th 449, 453 (2000), appeal quashed , 789 A.2d 696
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), vacated by  836 A.2d 42 (Pa. 2003).
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of discovery, a court has discretion to determine whether it is
premature to require expert testimony at such a stage or to re-
quire the non-moving party to come forward with whatever ex-
pert testimony it may have.255  While a court could theoretically
require expert testimony at the outset, the more ordinary proce-
dure is to require it only when the plaintiff has had a reasonable
period of time to obtain an expert and has not done so.
Third, the defendant may seek to limit discovery under tradi-
tional, protective order grounds.  Like Federal Rule 26(c), most
state procedure codes provide courts broad discretion to limit or
condition discovery to protect a party from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden.256  While that discretion
nominally extends to ordering that the discovery not be allowed,
it is extremely rare for a court to prohibit entirely the discovery
of relevant, non-privileged evidence.  While Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(iii) does permit a court to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis to decide whether to permit challenged discov-
ery, courts have hesitated to use that power to prohibit discovery
that was necessary to a party’s claim when no acceptable substi-
tute was available.257  However, the broad discretion already ex-
isting in the rules gives the court substantial ammunition to
balance the respective interests of the plaintiff and the
defendant.
255 See, e.g. , Wilbourn v. Shiben, Nos. 2002-CA-00312-MR, 2002-CA-000942-MR,
2003 WL 21299627, at *5 (Ky. Ct. App. June 6, 2003) (affirming summary judgment
granted for lack of expert discovery prior to deadline for disclosing experts, but
noting that “the court does retain discretion to find that sufficient time has not
elapsed”); Daniel v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 544 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 2001) (re-
versing summary judgment where court should have permitted plaintiff time to find
an expert).
256 E.g. , N.J. R. CT. 4:10-3; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3103(a).
257 Rule 26(b)(1) was revised in 2000 to emphasize this power, in part because the
rules committee was concerned that the court’s discretion to limit discovery was not
being “implemented . . . with the vigor that was contemplated.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26
Advisory Committee Notes 2000.  Even since those amendments, Rule 26(b)(2)(iii)
has principally been invoked to curtail unnecessary discovery, not to permit a wide
ranging analysis of the merits of plaintiff’s claim. E.g. , Duran-Perez v. Citibank,
N.A., No. 02-Civ. 9793LBSDFE, 2003 WL 22118965, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2003)
(finding that the information sought was duplicative and of limited relevance follow-
ing multiple, more relevant, depositions); Ricotta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 211 F.R.D.
622, 624 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (refusing to permit massive discovery of adversary’s expert
to prove bias without any predicate showing of bias).  Frequently, courts permit dis-
covery that is burdensome relative to the issues at stake but shift costs to more
appropriately balance the burdens of discovery. E.g. , OpenTV v. Liberate Techs.,
219 F.R.D. 474, 477-78 (N.D. Cal. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217
F.R.D. 309, 321-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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There are several examples of orders a court might enter.  As
one, a common potential concern of John Doe defendants is that
the plaintiff will impose some kind of non-judicial penalty upon
them for negative, but not actionable, speech.  For example, an
employee who criticizes working conditions may be fired, or a
vendor who criticizes a client’s business practices may be re-
placed.  A theoretically possible way to deal with this concern
would be to limit discovery to outside attorneys and, possibly, a
limited subset of plaintiff’s insiders, such as an in-house attorney.
While such an order is preferable to denying the discovery re-
quest outright, it does little to address plaintiff’s concerns.  Deci-
sion-makers within plaintiff’s insider group will have a legitimate
need to know the defendant’s identity both because that will al-
low an informed decision of whether to pursue the claim—a libel
action against an impecunious outsider may have little appeal
compared to one against a competitor—and because the defen-
dant’s identity may be essential to investigation and understand-
ing of the offense.  For example, if certain employees had signed
non-disparagement agreements while others had not, the identity
may be relevant to determining whether there was a claim at all.
A better, and more direct, approach would be to order the plain-
tiff not to take any extra-judicial action against the defendant
pending either a judgment of liability or further order of the
court.  The plaintiff could not fire or terminate a defendant un-
less it proved its case.  While this is obviously a less than perfect
solution, since it could become uncomfortable for an exposed
employee even if no formal action is taken against her, such a
situation would not be lightly undertaken by most employers.
Once the employee is identified, the employer will have a strong
incentive to prosecute the case, if only to terminate the em-
ployee, rather than to keep the employee on.  In effect, the em-
ployee could become close to untouchable.  There might be
situations in which a court would modify its order to permit ex-
tra-judicial action against the defendant prior to judgment.  For
example, if the poster is an attorney for the plaintiff who has
disclosed privileged information, or even simply disparaged her
client in violation of her professional obligations, the issue of
whether the posting was technically defamatory would become
almost academic, and it is unlikely that a court would insist on
the plaintiff’s continuing to retain, and disclose confidences to,
the defendant.
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Second, the court could require a bond to be posted.  Such a
requirement would respond to the problem that, for some plain-
tiffs, discovery of the identity rather than ultimate judgment may
be the relief they are really seeking, and that the court should not
lightly grant plaintiff the relief sought under the guise of a dis-
covery motion.  By requiring a bond, like in a preliminary injunc-
tion, there is an opportunity for relief for the defendant if it turns
out that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought.  The addi-
tional expense of the bond requirement may also serve to deter
suits that are brought without intention of pursuing them
through trial.
D. Serving the Subpoenas
Obtaining a court-ordered subpoena does not assure that the
defendant will be identified.  While most ISPs will cooperate with
court-ordered process, cooperation may be more difficult to ob-
tain when a foreign or smaller domestic ISP is involved.  Moreo-
ver, as ISPs are coming to realize that there are good business
reasons for protecting their customers’ privacy, they are more
likely to require technical compliance with procedural rules that
may make discovery expensive.  For example, if a plaintiff ob-
tains a subpoena in state court in New Jersey, that subpoena will
not automatically be enforceable against a California ISP with no
(non-Internet) presence in New Jersey.  The ISP will be in a posi-
tion to insist that the plaintiff go through the further (and poten-
tially expensive) procedure of obtaining a commission in New
Jersey, commencing a special proceeding in California (requiring
local counsel), and obtaining a subpoena in California court.
Particularly in light of the controversial nature of this kind of
discovery demand, there will be some chance that, notwithstand-
ing the host court’s order granting discovery, the local court may
require new proceedings again justifying the subpoena.258
If the subpoena is served and documents produced, there is
still no certainty that the defendant will be identified.  If the ISP
subpoenaed is a paid Internet service provider, such as America
Online or Earthlink, it is likely to have the defendant’s identify-
ing information.  However, if, as is probably more likely, the re-
cipient is a free Internet service, such as Yahoo! or Hotmail, it
may not have information sufficient to identify the individual
258 This happened in America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co. , 542
S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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poster.  Rather, it will usually have computer-generated informa-
tion concerning the IP address from which the defendant posted,
which should identify the defendant’s direct ISP.  For example, if
a defendant used an AOL account to post an anonymous mes-
sage to a Yahoo! message board, Yahoo! would usually have in-
formation that identifies the poster as an AOL customer.  A
subpoena could then be issued to AOL to determine the poster’s
identity (or at least the identity of the person whose account was
used for the posting).  That subpoena, of course, may lead to ad-
ditional proceedings in another state.
Finally, there is the risk that the trail may run cold.  Even as-
suming all parties comply with discovery demands and have
properly maintained records of the relevant computer access, the
defendant may have posted from an “Internet café” or otherwise
be practically unidentifiable.259  Though there is no hard evi-
dence available, one suspects that this is an increasingly likely
outcome, as growing public awareness of the traceability of on-
line conduct leads people to be more cautious about guarding
their identities.
The process, then, is not simple or inexpensive for a plaintiff,
even once discovery has been ordered by the court.  The exis-
tence of these practical hurdles to discovery provides a substan-
tial deterrent to plaintiffs seeking this kind of discovery, and
would therefore tend to weed out plaintiffs who do not believe
that their claims are valuable and important to their own inter-
ests or who assert claims to harass a defendant.  The existence of
these heavy burdens under existing law suggest that imposing ad-
ditional hurdles is likely to over-deter this kind of action (if they
are not over-deterred already).
E. Post-Discovery Remedies
In addition to the substantial existing hurdles to discovering
the identity of anonymous defendants, which as noted above im-
pose cost burdens that should deter many frivolous or improper
claims, there are post-disclosure remedies that should further de-
259 In fact, one of the defendants in the Dendrite  case claims to have been doing
just that.  Posting of ajcazz, supra  note 84 (“This could get real funny!  So funny that
my lawyer will sit on a beach for along [sic] time when I’m done with them.  This is
real funny since my IP is coming from a cyber café.  Track the time I’m in the café
also.”).  His claim proved to be false.
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ter improper claims and may also provide unfairly unmasked de-
fendants with some remedy.
Numerous sanctions exist for abuse of the legal process.
Fabrication of a false claim to obtain discovery would expose
both the plaintiff and its lawyer to the risk of judicial sanctions
under Rule 11 and its state analogues260 and, in the case of the
lawyer, professional discipline.  Likewise, most states provide a
civil remedy for abuse of process.261
While these sanctions will probably only come into play in the
most egregious cases, that is a balance that is common in all
kinds of modern litigation.  Litigation is, by its nature, expensive
and unpleasant for defendants, and it is an everyday occurrence
that defendants must provide relevant discovery that they would
prefer not to provide for reasons of cost, embarrassment, or oth-
erwise.  There is no compelling reason to provide a broader pro-
tection in this one category of cases.
V
A CRITIQUE OF CREATING NEW RULES FOR
INTERNET POSTERS
The judicial creation of a different set of procedural rules for
this single class of cases is troubling for a variety of reasons.
First, and perhaps most critically, new rules are not necessary.
This is true as an initial matter because, as set forth in Part III
above, the First Amendment does not require the adaptation of
special procedural rules in this context.  Rather, the Supreme
Court has recognized that common law defamation claims pro-
vide an essential safeguard protecting the public against the risk
of abuse inherent in the right to speak anonymously.  Unlike
blanket prior restrictions against anonymous speech, common
law claims are less objectionable because they are targeted at ac-
tionable speech, rather than speech generally.262  Obviously, such
defamation actions cannot serve their function of deterring and
punishing wrongdoing—and thus allowing anonymous speech to
260 FED. R. CIV. P. 11; N.J. R. CT. 1:4-8; see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16
(West 2004) (imposing sanctions for certain lawsuits designated as “strategic lawsuits
against public participation” (“SLAPP suits”)).
261 E.g. , Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Stewart, 863 So. 2d 925, 931 (Miss.
2003); Curiano v. Suozzi, 469 N.E.2d 1324, 1326 (N.Y. 1984); Drake v. McCulloh, 43
P.3d 578, 586 (Wyo. 2002).
262 See, e.g. , McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349-50, 353 & n.13
(1995).
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be protected when it is not actionable—unless defendants can be
identified.  Likewise, the Supreme Court has also held that even
discovery of anonymous journalistic sources is unconstrained by
the First Amendment except at the extremes involving harass-
ment or seeking irrelevant information.263
The creation of new rules is unnecessary for a more fundamen-
tal reason, however—because the legitimate interests of John
Doe defendants can be protected without them.  As Judge Frank
Coffin suggested a quarter century ago in the analogous context
of journalistic privilege, the only “special procedure” that is nec-
essary is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, sensitively and intel-
ligently applied:
[W]e find the “special procedures” suitable for this case to be
the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (“General Provisions
Governing Discovery”) with a heightened sensitivity to any
First Amendment implication that might result from the com-
pelled disclosure of sources. The conflicting considerations are
contained in the language of the Rule. On the one hand,
“(p)arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not
privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter . . . .  “On
the other hand, the court “may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embar-
rassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .”264
Judge Coffin discusses numerous considerations that may be
relevant, including whether plaintiff’s claim could survive sum-
mary judgment as to the elements for which the contested discov-
ery is not necessary, how strong the claim of confidentiality is
under the circumstances, whether there are alternative means to
obtain the same information, and whether any of various proce-
dures might be devised by the judge to permit plaintiff to obtain
the necessary discovery while at the same time protecting defen-
dant’s interests as well.265  Judge Coffin wisely recognized, how-
ever, that the key was sensitive and flexible application of
existing rules:
We deliberately refrain from further categorizing with any
precision what inquiries should be made by the court or in
what sequence. The task is one that demands sensitivity, in-
vites flexibility, and defies formula. While obviously the dis-
263 See  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707; see also id . at 709-10 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
264 Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596-97 (1st Cir.
1980).
265 Id.  at 597-98.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 63 12-APR-05 10:43
Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants 857
cretion of the trial judge has wide scope, it is a discretion
informed by an awareness of First Amendment values and the
precedential effect which decision in any one case would be
likely to have. Given the sensitivity of inquiry in this delicate
area, detailed findings of fact and explanation of the decision
would be appropriate. . . .  In short, our criticism is that the
balancing process was not conducted with sufficient awareness
of the contesting values, the factors to be considered, and the
options available to the court. This is hardly a criticism of the
district court, which had to act without the benefit of any gui-
dance tailored to the case at hand. We therefore remand the
case for reconsideration of the plaintiff’s motion to compel
discovery in light of our discussion.266
Judge Coffin’s view of judging remains relevant in the Internet
era.  At best, new judicially-created tests are confusing and un-
necessary, accomplishing the same results but at the cost of un-
certainty and complication.  At worst, by detaching the analysis
from the moorings of ordinary procedure, the glitter of a new test
may divert judges from a nuanced inquiry responding to the
case’s particular circumstances in favor of application of the test
for its own sake, without consideration of whether the test is
well-tailored to the needs of that case.267
Second, while a sensitively-applied discretion to balance com-
peting interests is essential, the adoption of the Dendrite test
would give judges the wrong kind of discretion, namely the dis-
cretion to deny or grant discovery based on subjective evaluation
of the worth of particular claims.  Such unguided discretion may
compromise other core values of the judicial system.  Constitu-
tional rights, including the rights of due process and trial by jury,
as well as time-tested rules of civil procedure, are intended to
assure each litigant his or her day in court.  Appellate courts exist
to remedy errors in the process and protect those core values.
The creation of a system that allows a judge to (in effect, if not in
name) dismiss meritorious claims with little appellate oversight is
a substantial infringement on the truth- and justice-finding func-
tions of the courts.268
266 Id.  at 598-99.
267 See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 346 (1993).
268 See, e.g. , United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (“We are similarly distressed by the district judge’s decision to allow the Doe
Companies to proceed anonymously . . . .  Such proceedings would . . . seriously
implicate due process.”). But see  Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
294 n.1 (2000) (implicitly approving a district court’s decision to permit students
challenging school prayer to litigate anonymously to avoid possible harassment).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-3\ORE306.txt unknown Seq: 64 12-APR-05 10:43
858 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
Third, the rush to create new procedural rules because of tech-
nological development carries inherent risk.  One suspects that
the broad information-gathering power of the Internet impelled
the Dendrite court to offer defendants broader protection than
called for under existing law.  The ability to learn a speaker’s
identity online may seem more worrisome than the ability to
learn it through a trip to a government office, as approved in
Buckley , because it is so much easier to obtain the information
online.  While this is an understandable concern, the rapidity of
technological and societal change related to the Internet makes
the fashioning of an appropriate judicial response problematic.
Even since Dendrite (and perhaps in part because of Dendrite),
there has been increasing public awareness of the risk of disclo-
sure of one’s identity when acting anonymously online.  For ex-
ample, the lack of anonymity on the Internet has been the
subject of a concerted advertising campaign by a major Internet
service provider, Earthlink, and an episode of a popular televi-
sion series, Law & Order .  The numerous subpoenas served by
the recording industry have fulfilled their intended purpose of
making Internet users aware that their actions online are not
anonymous or untraceable.  As noted above, ISPs are resisting
discovery demands for the very reason that the market demands
it.
Thus, defendants now may have greater notice than in previ-
ous years of the limits of their anonymity when they choose to
post on the Internet, and a greater opportunity to “hide their
tracks” if they so desire (by, for example, posting from an In-
ternet café).269  Similarly, and perhaps more ominously, informa-
tion gathering technology is developing rapidly, meaning that it
may become increasingly easy to identify John Does without sub-
poenas; restrictive discovery rules may encourage the use of such
technologies, which may be more dangerous than discovery
guided by judicial oversight and regulated by appropriate protec-
tive orders.
The casual discovery of the identity of individuals acting anon-
ymously on the Internet is a serious and legitimate First Amend-
ment concern.  However, existing procedural rules, designed to
deal with a wide variety of cases involving the discovery of evi-
dence defendants would prefer not to have revealed, are suffi-
269 Yahoo! and many other Internet service providers have long posted disclaim-
ers advising users of limits on their online privacy.
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cient to address that concern while also protecting the legitimate
rights of claimants.  At a minimum, the rush to create new stan-
dards, at odds with prior jurisprudence, carries a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of skewing the balance against claimants and
allowing anonymity to shield wrongdoing.  The courts should
proceed cautiously in creating new rules and should, instead, try
to address these cases through existing frameworks.
CONCLUSION
The need to rule on discovery motions seeking to identify de-
fendants speaking anonymously on the Internet poses substantial
challenges for judges.  In effect, judges are called upon to make
outcome-dispositive determinations at the commencement of an
action, before discovery or development of a full record.  While
the effects of courts’ rulings are likely to be substantive, appel-
late review is systematically limited because the issue is usually
raised in the context of an interlocutory discovery application.
These cases present difficult issues for judges because often both
the plaintiff and the defendant can articulate clear and important
interests in the favorable resolution of the discovery dispute.  As
a result of these difficulties, both courts and commentators have
advocated for the creation of new standards or “tests” to govern
such motions.  This rush to create new standards, however, is it-
self problematic.  Courts already possess substantial tools and
discretion to balance appropriately the competing interests.
While appellate guidance is welcome, the creation of additional
standards or tests is unnecessary and may offer little genuine
benefit to trial judges, while at the same time introducing new
sources of error by creating a false sense of certainty in an uncer-
tain area and, in particular, inviting judges to engage in an inap-
propriate subjective evaluation of the “worth” of an individual
plaintiff’s claim.
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